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ABSTRACT 
Does Congress have power to deny copyright protection for specific 
content? The Copyright Clause grants Congress power to “promote the 
Progress of Science” by legislating copyright laws. Certainly some content 
may reasonably be viewed as failing to promote the progress of science. 
Violent video games or pornography, for instance, may reasonably be 
viewed as not promoting progress in science, even though they receive 
protection as free speech under the First Amendment. So even if the Free 
Speech Clause bars Congress from banning content, does the Copyright 
Clause provide Congress a permissible means to discourage production of 
that content? 
This Article considers whether such content-based copyright denial is 
permissible under Congress’s copyright power. Neither courts nor scholars 
have considered this question, despite the fact that lawmakers are presently 
seeking to control negative effects of specific content. This Article posits 
that the copyright power provides Congress that means. The Copyright 
Clause’s mandate to promote the progress of science suggests a power to 
exercise content discrimination. At the same time, denying copyright to 
content would not prevent content creators from engaging in, and even 
profiting from, any speech protected by the First Amendment. The Article 
concludes that the Copyright Clause provides a constitutional tool for 
fixing content-based problems. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of recent school shootings, violent video games have 
become subject to public criticism.1 This raises an obvious question: can 
Congress do anything to control the proliferation of such games? At first 
glance, it would seem that Congress cannot. The Supreme Court has 
recently recognized First Amendment protection for violent video games, 
overturning a state ban on their sale.2 Nevertheless, the Court’s holding 
does not end the discussion. The Court never suggested that free-speech 
protection from government censorship entitles those games to copyright 
protection from private copying.3 And copyright protection is important for 
 
1.  See, e.g., Lou Kesten, Shooting Renews Argument over Video-Game Violence, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Dec. 19, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2012/12/19/ 
shooting-renews-argument-over-video-game-violence. 
2.  See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
3.  See Ned Snow, Content-Based Copyright Denial, 90 IND. L.J. 1473, 1478 (2015) (concluding 
that scope of the Free Speech Clause is distinct from the scope of the Copyright Clause). 
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their proliferation.4 Reducing copyright reduces profits, and reducing 
profits reduces production. So although Congress cannot ban violent video 
games as unprotected speech, whether Congress must incent them through 
copyright is an entirely different question—though one with similar 
implications. 
The Constitution appears to answer this question through the Copyright 
Clause.5 That Clause suggests that copyrightable content must “promote 
the Progress of Science.”6 Because it seems reasonable to believe that 
violent video games fail to promote such progress, the Copyright Clause 
appears to provide Congress justification to deny those games a copyright. 
To be clear, the fact that the law protects violent video games from free-
speech abridgments does not imply that the law recognizes their promotion 
of progress.7 This Article therefore examines the Copyright Clause to 
conclude that Congress may deny copyright for specific content in an effort 
to decrease its production. 
Of course this question is not unique to violent video games. There are 
several categories of content that, although protected by the First 
Amendment, come under scrutiny for various reasons. Consider hate 
speech, pornography, or crime-facilitating material. Some First 
Amendment scholars have argued for government to control these 
categories of content for various social-policy reasons.8 Surprisingly, 
though, their arguments ignore a very practical means for doing so: 
copyright law. Copyright scholars have similarly ignored the issue of 
whether the Copyright Clause gives Congress power to pursue social 
policies through a content-based copyright regime.9 The literature is silent 
on this fundamental question: does the Copyright Clause allow Congress to 
exercise content discrimination in defining copyright eligibility? 
This Article proposes an interpretation of the Copyright Clause that 
allows Congress to exercise content discrimination in legislating copyright 
 
4.  See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 332 (1989); cf. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The 
Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 45–47 (2011) (suggesting that creators will overvalue works 
that embody greater creativity). 
5.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
6.  See id. 
7.  See Snow, supra note 3, at 1479–83, 1485. 
8.  See, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levinson, Targeted Hate Speech and the First Amendment: How the 
Supreme Court Should Have Decided Snyder, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 45, 45 (2013); Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1985); 
Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1217 (2005). 
9.  Professor Ann Bartow has argued that Congress should deny copyright for pornographic 
works. See Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 19–25, 48 (2012). She 
makes persuasive policy arguments. This Article, by contrast, addresses the constitutional issues 
relating to the Copyright Clause inherent in her proposal. 
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law. Importantly, this Article does not consider whether the First 
Amendment permits such an exercise of the copyright power. That question 
I have addressed in another work, ultimately concluding that the First 
Amendment does not prevent content discrimination in the copyright 
context insofar as the discrimination is viewpoint-neutral.10 Here, I take up 
the question of whether the Copyright Clause contemplates such 
discrimination, and whether such an interpretation of the Copyright Clause 
makes sense as a matter of constitutional policy. 
In Part II, I examine the text of the Copyright Clause as well as its 
treatment by Congress and the Judiciary. The text of that Clause provides 
support for content discrimination: the Clause premises Congress’s power 
on promoting “the Progress of Science,”11 and Progress suggests a power 
to determine which copyrightable content will effect advancements and 
improvements in knowledge.12 Additionally, congressional history provides 
limited support for this interpretation; specifically, the Copyright Act 
designates criteria for copyright eligibility that requires content 
examination.13 Supreme Court case law lends only minimal support for the 
interpretation, although the case law certainly does not preclude it: in 
particular, a 1903 Supreme Court decision—Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co.14—dealing with copyright eligibility is consistent with 
the interpretation, and statements by the modern Court in Golan v. Holder15 
and Eldred v. Ashcroft16 may be construed either way, supporting or 
opposing the interpretation.17 
In Part III, I consider policy reasons for and against this interpretation 
of the Copyright Clause. I recite two reasons in support of the 
interpretation.18 First, Congress has a collective perspective that individuals 
lack in assessing content value.19 This is particularly relevant because the 
purpose of the copyright power is to serve a collective end—namely, 
promoting the progress of science.20 Second, Congress has institutional 
means that can minimize wasteful effects of the copyright monopoly.21 
Such wasteful effects often depend on the particular content under 
 
10.  See Snow, supra note 3, at 1489. 
11.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
12.  See discussion infra Part II.A. 
13.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); discussion infra Part II.B. 
14.  188 U.S. 239, 250–52 (1903). 
15.  132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012). 
16.  537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003). 
17.  See discussion infra Part II.C. 
18.  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
19.  See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
20.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
21.  See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
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consideration.22 Lastly, I discuss policy arguments against the 
interpretation: specifically, an untrustworthy Congress, industry capture, 
and the subjective nature of identifying value in expression.23 Recognizing 
merit in these arguments, I nevertheless conclude that they do not counsel 
against a content-based interpretation of the Copyright Clause. 
In Part IV, I consider two examples of content for which Congress 
might prospectively deny copyright—violent video games and 
pornography. I briefly summarize policy arguments specific to those 
examples which might suggest or discourage the denial. I then analyze the 
constitutionality of their respective denials. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 
Congress’s copyright power derives from the Intellectual Property 
Clause. That Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”24 
With respect to copyright law specifically, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the following language from the Intellectual Property Clause as 
representing Congress’s copyright power (as distinct from its patent 
power): “To promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited 
Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings . . . .”25 The quoted language is referred to as the Copyright 
Clause, which is part of the Intellectual Property Clause.26 
Like all powers of Congress, the copyright power is discretionary: 
Congress may choose to promote the progress of science through the means 
of extending copyright.27 The issue that this part examines is the scope of 
discretion that this power affords Congress.28 On the one hand, the 
 
22.  See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
23.  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
24.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
25.  Id. 
26.  The modern Supreme Court has construed the initial phrase, “To promote the Progress of 
Science,” as corresponding to Congress’s copyright power. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 
(2012) (“Perhaps counterintuitively for the contemporary reader, Congress’ copyright authority is tied 
to the progress of science; its patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts.”). 
27.  See id. at 903–04. 
28.  It might be argued that my interpretation of the Copyright Clause incorrectly infers a 
negative power to deny copyright from the Clause’s affirmative power to grant copyright. The power to 
grant does not imply a power to take away. This argument, however, misrepresents my interpretation of 
the Clause. My interpretation does not recognize a power to deny copyright to authors who have already 
received a copyright, but rather to prospectively change eligibility criteria. In short, denying copyright 
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discretion may be narrow, such that Congress has only a binary choice in 
exercising the power: namely, the choice of whether to extend copyright to 
all original content or none whatsoever. On the other hand, the discretion 
may be broad, such that Congress may choose among categories of content 
in deciding whether to extend copyright protection, and for that matter, 
how much protection to extend. This part argues for the latter 
interpretation—a broad discretionary power that allows Congress to engage 
in content discrimination in extending copyright. 
Section A interprets the text of the Copyright Clause to suggest the 
latter interpretation. Section B recites the history of Congress in further 
support. Section C analyzes Supreme Court precedent that indirectly 
addresses the issue. 
A. Textual Interpretation 
This section interprets the Copyright Clause as suggesting that 
Congress has constitutional discretion to determine copyrightable 
categories of content, and at the same time, that courts have power to 
restrain that discretion. In offering this interpretation, I divide the 
Copyright Clause into two distinct phrases for ease of identification: the 
first phrase is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science,” which I refer to as 
the Progress Clause; the second phrase is “by securing for limited Times to 
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings,” which I refer 
to as the Writings Clause.29 Subsection 1 argues that in view of the 
Writings Clause, the Progress Clause must grant Congress discretion to 
determine content eligibility for copyright. Subsection 2 argues that the 
discretionary power of Congress follows from the meaning of Progress. 
Subsection 3 argues that the meaning of Science suggests the judicial 
power to restrain that discretion. 
1. The Progress Clause as a Meaningful Power 
The Supreme Court and several scholars have recognized that the 
language in the Progress Clause—“[t]o promote the Progress of Science”—
represents a grant of power.30 So as a grant of power, the Progress Clause 
 
involves Congress refraining from exercising its power; it does not involve Congress exercising a 
negative power. 
29.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
30.  See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–8 (1966); WILLIAM F. PATRY, 2 
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:9 (2014); Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: 
Promoting Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 
1810–16 (2006); Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking Constitutional Indifference to 
Harmful Content in Copyright, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Regressing Progress]; 
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must contain a power that Congress could not otherwise perform under the 
Writings Clause. That is, instead of giving Congress power to “secur[e] for 
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings,” the Constitution gives Congress the power to “promote the 
Progress of Science.”31 Why? What is the power in the Progress Clause that 
is distinct from the Writings Clause? The answer is simple: the Progress 
Clause gives Congress power to direct the means designated in the 
Writings Clause toward the end of the copyright power designated in the 
Progress Clause. Congress has power to determine the best way to use 
copyright in order to effectuate progress in science. And on the assumption 
that “the Progress of Science” suggests a content-based end (which 
assumption I explore in Subsection 2 below), the power within the Progress 
Clause appears to include a power to direct authors toward content that 
promotes progress in science. Thus, as distinct from the Writings Clause, 
the Progress Clause appears to give Congress authority to direct authors 
toward certain content. 
The strength of this interpretation becomes evident when considering 
the contrary interpretation. The contrary interpretation would deny 
Congress the power to discriminate among content in extending copyright. 
Such an interpretation would suggest that the Progress Clause is 
unnecessary. That is, the Progress Clause would not grant any power to 
Congress that the Writings Clause did not already provide—meaning that a 
power to secure exclusive rights to authors of writings would be sufficient 
for Congress to extend copyright to all original content, leaving the phrase 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science” as unnecessary surplusage.32 Hence, 
if the Progress Clause does actually grant a power to Congress, it must 
provide Congress the discretion to direct the means contained in the 
Writings Clause. 
In addition to making the Progress Clause seem unnecessary, the 
contrary interpretation would suggest the absence of the very power 
specified in the Progress Clause. If Congress could only copyright all 
content, Congress’s power would amount to a power to promote an 
increase in the output of any and all original expression. Yet more 
expression does not necessarily lead to progress in science. Defamatory 
content, for instance, may be highly creative but entirely false—not likely 
to lead to progress in science. More is not always better. Indeed, more 
content that is false, that is harmful, or perhaps simply distracting, could 
 
Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
31.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
32.  See id. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be 
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect . . . .”). 
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lead to regress in science.33 If Congress can only copyright all content, 
Congress would be impotent to stop such a regress. Therefore, interpreting 
the Copyright Clause as compelling Congress to extend copyright to all 
categories of content suggests the absence of a power that enables Congress 
to promote progress in science. 
Of course these arguments rely on the premise that the Progress Clause 
is in fact a grant of power and not merely a meaningless preamble that 
introduces the actual power in the remaining Writings Clause. Although 
some courts and commentators have—without any reasoned analysis—
labeled the Progress Clause as a preamble in the Copyright Clause, none 
have asserted that the phrase fails to grant power.34 Those courts and 
commentators have simply argued that the Progress Clause does not 
restrain Congress. Moreover, Professor Lawrence Solum has argued that 
the grammatical structure in all the powers granted to Congress under 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution implies that “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science” is a grant of power.35 He has concluded that “the 
promotion of science is the power granted and the securing of exclusive 
rights operates as a limitation on the means that may be used in employing 
this power.”36 Professor William Patry has agreed with this conclusion, 
relying on the constitutional principle that every word of the Constitution 
must have meaning.37 Given the arguments that others, and I, have made 
elsewhere on this issue concerning the Progress Clause as a grant of power, 
I do not address it here.38 I merely observe that my argument that Progress 
 
33.  See Snow, supra note 30, at 42–46. 
34.  See, e.g., Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting the argument that 
“the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on congressional power”); 
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128, 130 (8th Cir. 1985) (“We agree 
with Professor Nimmer that although the promotion of artistic and scientific creativity and the benefits 
flowing therefrom to the public are purposes of the Copyright Clause, those purposes do not limit 
Congress’s power to legislate in the field of copyright.”); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] at 1-88.19–1-88.20 (2011) (“[T]he phrase ‘To promote the progress 
of science and useful arts . . . ’ must be read as largely in the nature of a preamble, indicating the 
purpose of the power but not in limitation of its exercise.” (footnotes omitted)); Scott M. Martin, The 
Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright 
Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 299 (2002) (construing “promote the Progress of Science” as 
indicating mere purpose without any limiting force on the actual power). 
35.  See Solum, supra note 30, at 12–25. 
36.  Id. at 23. 
37.  2 PATRY, supra note 30, § 3:9 (characterizing the preambular construction as an “absurd” 
approach that serves only to “render [the Progress Clause] meaningless, the equivalent of mottos on 
license plates; that is contrary to the general theory of interpretation that insists on giving every word 
meaning” and noting that “[n]o clause in Article I, Section 8 has a preamble”). 
38.  See Snow, supra note 30, at 42–46; Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright 
Clause, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 276–306 (2013). In addition to me, Professors Lawrence Solum, 
Dotan Oliar, and William Patry have advocated the non-preambular interpretation. See 2 PATRY, supra 
note 30, § 3:9; Oliar, supra note 30, at 1810–16; Solum, supra note 30, at 12–25. 
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gives content-based discretion to Congress relies on the premise that the 
initial Progress Clause of the Copyright Clause represents a grant of power 
to Congress. 
2. Progress as Suggesting Congressional Discretion 
The argument that Congress has discretion to determine whether 
specific content is eligible for copyright draws support from the meaning of 
Progress. The Progress Clause sets forth the purpose of copyright as 
promoting “the Progress of Science.” In the subparts below, I argue that 
Progress in that context means an improvement or advancement in 
knowledge. If that meaning is correct, it implies that some knowledge is 
qualitatively better than other knowledge. That is to say, some knowledge 
is to be considered an improvement or advancement as compared to other 
knowledge. So, if Congress has power to promote progress—improvements 
and advancements in knowledge—then it would seem that Congress has 
power to promote some knowledge over other knowledge. Stated 
differently, Progress as an improvement or advancement in knowledge 
suggests that Congress has power to target which sort of knowledge it will 
promote. Congress, then, would have power to exercise content-based 
discrimination in order to achieve progress. 
One might argue that even if Progress means improvement or 
advancement in knowledge, the ultimate realization of progress turns on the 
public’s preference for content, rather than on the whims of Congress. 
Under this argument, the public would decide whether content effectuates 
progress in the course of the public’s choosing which content to consume. 
Such an interpretation would not leave Congress room to discriminate in 
extending copyright. The public would decide progress. 
This argument, however, is unpersuasive as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation. The phrase “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the 
Progress of Science” indicates that the power of promoting progress is 
given to Congress—not to the public.39 Moreover, as a general matter, 
where a constitutional grant of power to Congress includes a term that 
contemplates different means of application, Congress is given discretion 
to judge the best means to apply that term.40 Only a rational-basis review 
by the Judiciary restrains Congress’s discretion in exercising power under 
such a broad term.41 For instance, consider Congress’s discretion under the 
 
39.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8 (emphasis added). 
40.  See generally United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010) (“[W]e look to see 
whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power.”). 
41.  See generally id. 
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General Welfare Clause.42 Congress determines the best means to provide 
for general welfare—not the public. Indeed, if that Clause were construed 
so that the application of general welfare were left to the public rather than 
to Congress (which construction would be analogous to interpreting the 
Copyright Clause in a way that the application of progress were left to the 
public), then Congress would only be able to provide cash subsidies to the 
public; only then would the public be able to decide which expenditures 
provide for the general welfare. But of course this cannot be. Congress—
not the public—determines which expenditures will best provide for the 
general welfare. Accordingly, Congress—not the public—determines 
which expression will best promote the progress of science.43 
Thus, to the extent that the Progress Clause allows for qualitative 
judgments, Congress must make them.44 More specifically, the meaning of 
Progress as improvements and advancements in knowledge—a content-
based end45—appears to vest Congress with discretion to determine which 
categories of content will fulfill that end. Some commentators, however, 
have interpreted Progress of Science in a way that suggests that the 
copyright power enables Congress only to increase the output of 
expression, rather than to seek qualitatively superior content.46 This 
interpretation I reject. The subsections below present and respond to this 
interpretation. 
 
42.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
43.  See generally Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937) (holding that spending power 
implies broad discretionary power for Congress and that general welfare has a dynamic meaning). 
Examples abound of Congress exercising discretion under broad terms of its constitutional grant. For 
instance, Congress has exercised discretion under its tax power to penalize citizens who fail to obtain 
health insurance, see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–95 (2012), and 
under its commerce power to protect threatened wildlife, see San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. 
Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2011). Public opinion on a particular issue does not change 
the validity of Congress’s exercise of judgment under a broad term. See, e.g., 57% View Health Care 
Law Unfavorably, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (July 28, 2014), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_ 
content/archive/health_care_update_archive/july_2014/57_view_health_care_law_unfavorably. 
44.  Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250–52 (1903) (recognizing 
congressional choice to deny copyright to “prints or labels designed to be used for any other articles of 
manufacture,” while construing the discriminatory term fine arts for pictorial illustrations as giving too 
much discretion to judges). 
45.  See generally C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
891, 923 (2002). (“[C]opyright has a content-based purpose, specifically good or more valued 
content.”). 
46.  See Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, “To Promote the Progress of Science”: The Copyright 
Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2002); Malla Pollack, 
What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the 
United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001). 
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a. Commentators on Progress 
There are two positions in the academic literature on the meaning of 
Progress in the Copyright Clause. Professor Laurence Solum has construed 
Progress to mean “advances in learning,” such that “[t]o ‘promote the 
Progress of Science’ would be to encourage the advancement of science 
or . . . scientific activity.”47 This construction implies, according to 
Professor Solum, a “focus on the results of scientific activity.”48 I refer to 
this interpretation as the advancement interpretation. Its followers include 
Professor Jeanne Fromer,49 Professor William Patry,50 and historian 
Edward Walterscheid.51 Professor Patry echoes the point that the 
advancement interpretation “focuses on encouraging particular results,” 
and specifically on “what the public will learn.”52 Professor Fromer 
observes that the advancement interpretation entails an improvement in 
either the quantity or the quality of knowledge.53 
The contrary position is that Progress means a physical movement, 
spread, or distribution of knowledge.54 Professor Malla Pollack has 
articulated this examination based, in large part, on her examination of the 
eighteenth-century editions of the Pennsylvania Gazette.55 Her 
interpretation rejects both a quantitative and qualitative advancement in 
knowledge, and it is thereby inconsistent with the advancement 
interpretation.56 I refer to her interpretation as the spread interpretation. Its 
followers include Professor Thomas Lee and Senator Orrin Hatch.57 
The spread interpretation appears problematic because it does not 
account for the specific context surrounding Progress within the Copyright 
Clause—namely, its description of science.58 Pollack appears correct, 
 
47.  Solum, supra note 30, at 45. 
48.  Id. at 45–46. 
49.  Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 
1329, 1373–74 (2012). 
50.  2 PATRY, supra note 30, § 3:6. 
51.  Edward C. Walterscheid, The Preambular Argument: The Dubious Premise of Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 44 IDEA 331, 374 (2004). 
52.  2 PATRY, supra note 30, § 3:6. 
53.  Fromer, supra note 49, at 1373. 
54.  Pollack, supra note 46, at 809. 
55.  See id. at 798–803. 
56.  Id. at 788–89. 
57.  Hatch & Lee, supra note 46, at 8–10 & n.42 (agreeing with Professor Pollack’s spread 
interpretation of Progress). 
58.  See 2 PATRY, supra note 30, § 3:6 (noting this problem with the spread interpretation). 
Pollack also dismisses well-respected lexicographers of the time. See Pollack, supra note 46, at 796–97. 
She rejects Samuel Johnson on the grounds that he was “upper class and inherently English—as 
opposed to American.” See id. at 797. She rejects Noah Webster as unreliable because he published his 
dictionary fifty years after the convention, despite the fact that he was a contemporary of the Framers 
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though, in her assertion that the Pennsylvania Gazette more often employed 
the word progress to mean physical movement, with the most common 
occurrence being the “progress of a fire.”59 Likewise, Lee and Hatch appear 
correct that in a Federalist Paper, Alexander Hamilton meant physical 
movement when discussing the progress of travel through a field.60 The 
Copyright Clause, however, does not give Congress power to promote the 
progress of fire or travel.61 It gives Congress the power to promote the 
progress of science.62 As discussed in the subsection below, this context of 
science indicates a meaning of Progress suggesting the advancement 
interpretation over the spread interpretation.63 
b. Evidence of the Meaning of Progress 
The literature setting forth the advancement interpretation has evinced 
little textual or historical evidence suggesting that interpretation.64 Yet such 
evidence does exist. Dictionary definitions of the time, the legislative 
history of the Copyright Clause, and writings of James Madison make clear 
that the advancement interpretation best reflects the meaning of Progress in 
the Copyright Clause. Because of the contrary scholarship on this point, 
and because the meaning of Progress is essential to my argument, I provide 
this historical evidence in the three subsections below. 
i. Dictionary Meaning 
Before analyzing dictionary entries, I should note that lexicographers at 
the time of the Framing did not usually list entries in order of most 
 
and had a keen interest in copyright prior to the constitutional convention. Compare id., with HARRY R. 
WARFEL, NOAH WEBSTER: SCHOOLMASTER TO AMERICA 53–59 (1936). 
59.  See Pollack, supra note 46, at 799. This makes sense for a newspaper, such as the 
Pennsylvania Gazette, that is attempting to objectively portray factual events, as opposed to 
commenting on qualitative advancements of abstract subjects such as science and knowledge. 
60.  See Hatch & Lee, supra note 46, at 9 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander 
Hamilton)). 
61.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Other objections to the spread interpretation may be found in the works of Professors Patry 
and Solum. See 2 PATRY, supra note 30, § 3:6; Solum, supra note 30, at 46. 
64.  Scholarship adopting the advancement position has recited minimal historical evidence to 
support the meaning, perhaps because it is so evident from the context of the Copyright Clause. In a 
single sentence, Walterscheid observed the similarity between the Copyright Clause and one of the 
proposals of Madison that employed the word advancement. See Walterscheid, supra note 51, at 376. 
Professor Solum relied on one of the definitions for progress in the Oxford English Dictionary, but he 
did not fully explain his reason for choosing that particular definition, other than “the context of the 
Intellectual Property Clause” suggesting it. Solum, supra note 30, at 45. Professors Patry and Fromer 
cite no historical evidence. See 2 PATRY, supra note 30, § 3:6; Fromer, supra note 49, at 1373–74. 
1 SNOW 583-633 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2016  8:34 AM 
596 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 67:3:583 
 
common usage.65 So rather than assuming that the first entry of a dictionary 
reflects the meaning of Progress in the Copyright Clause, I search for 
entries that suggest how Progress would describe Science, as in the phrase, 
“the Progress of Science.”66 As discussed below, dictionaries at the time of 
the Framing indicate that the meaning of Progress in the Copyright Clause 
is an advancement or improvement in knowledge or intellect. 
The most authoritative dictionary at the time of the Framing is arguably 
Dr. Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language.67 His dictionary 
employs five entries to define progress.68 Of the five entries, only one 
references knowledge or intellectual activity.69 That entry states: 
“intellectual improvement; advancement in knowledge; proficience.”70 This 
entry is the most applicable to the meaning of Progress in the Copyright 
Clause because intellectual activity and knowledge correspond to the 
meaning of Science in that Clause.71 Therefore, “intellectual improvement; 
advancement in knowledge; proficience” appears the most likely entry in 
Dr. Johnson’s dictionary that corresponds to the meaning of Progress in the 
Copyright Clause: the entry’s reference to knowledge and intellect refer to 
the same sort of subject matter that Progress describes in the Clause—
namely, science. 
Noah Webster’s definition of progress is also noteworthy given that he 
was a contemporary of the Framers who, prior to the Constitutional 
Convention, had been an ardent copyright advocate in the colonies.72 This 
fact suggests that at the time that he wrote his dictionary in 1828, he would 
have been aware of the significance of the meaning of progress as it relates 
to the Copyright Clause. Webster’s dictionary employs six entries to define 
 
65.  See, e.g., 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE preface at 6 
(London, J.F. & C. Rivington, 7th ed. 1785) (explaining that words are listed in order of progress in 
meaning, passing from its primitive to its remote and accidental meanings). 
66.  But see Hatch & Lee, supra note 46, at 8 & n.36 (citing only the first two entries of the four 
in Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, and the first two entries of the five in Johnson’s 1773 Dictionary, 
without explaining any reason for preferring the first two entries in either case). 
67.  See 1 JOHNSON, supra note 65 (unpaginated). The Supreme Court regularly relies on Dr. 
Johnson’s Dictionary. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008); Dep’t of 
Commerce v. U.S. House of Reps., 525 U.S. 316, 347 (1999). 
68.  See 2 JOHNSON, supra note 65 (unpaginated). 
69.  See id. The five entries are: 
1. Course; procession; passage. 
2. Advancement; motion forward. 
3. Intellectual improvement; advancement in knowledge; proficience. 
4. Removal from one place to another. 
5. A journey of State; a circuit. 
Id. 
70.  Id. 
71.  See Snow, supra note 38, at 306. 
72.  See WARFEL, supra note 58, at 53–59. 
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progress.73 Of the six entries, only one references knowledge—again, the 
subject matter of Science in the Copyright Clause.74 That entry states: 
“Advance in knowledge; intellectual or moral improvement; proficiency.”75 
Like Dr. Johnson’s dictionary, Webster’s reference to knowledge in only 
one entry suggests that the meaning of Progress in the Copyright Clause 
corresponds to an advance in knowledge, or intellectual or moral 
improvement. 
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) indicates the same meaning at 
the time of the Framing.76 Among its many definitions for progress, it 
provides the following: “Advancement to a further or higher stage, or to 
further or higher stages successively; growth; development, usually to a 
better state or condition; improvement; an instance of this.”77 Under this 
definition, it cites as an example of this meaning a use by Benjamin 
Franklin: “The rapid Progress true Science now makes, occasions my 
regretting sometimes that I was born so soon.”78 The statement provides 
meaning for progress within the context of science, and the statement is 
made by an influential Framer, Benjamin Franklin.79 The OED, then, 
recognizes that progress as meaning advancement or improvement reflects 
the meaning that Franklin intended in the quotation, and Franklin’s use of 
progress with science suggests that he employed the same meaning as 
found in the Copyright Clause. 
ii. Constitutional Convention 
The history of the Constitutional Convention also informs the meaning 
of Progress. Two delegates, Charles Pinckney and James Madison, made 
 
73.  2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S. 
Converse 1828) (unpaginated). The six entries are: 
1. A moving or going forward; a proceeding onward. 
2. A moving forward in growth; increase; as the progress of a plant or animal. 
3. Advance in business of any kind; as the progress of a negotiation; the progress of arts. 
4. Advance in knowledge; intellectual or moral improvement; proficiency. 
5. Removal; passage from place to place. 
6. A journey of state; a circuit. 
Id. 
74.  See id. 
75.  Id. 
76.  See Progress, n., OED ONLINE, http:/www.oed.com/view/Entry/152236?rskey=zHHBQF& 
result=1eid (last updated June 2007). 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. (emphasis deleted). 
79.  See Sean M. O’Connor, The Overlooked French Influence on the Intellectual Property 
Clause, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 803–05 (2015) (looking to Benjamin Franklin, among others, as a 
Framer whose view could have influenced the meaning of the IP Clause). 
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proposals relevant to the wording of the Intellectual Property Clause.80 
Pinckney proposed the following: “To establish seminaries for the 
promotion of literature and the arts & sciences”; “To secure to Authors 
exclusive rights for a certain time”; and “To grant patents for useful 
inventions.”81 Madison proposed the following: “To secure to literary 
authors their copy rights for a limited time”; and “To encourage by 
premiums & provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and 
discoveries.”82 
Together these proposals account for all the words (or variations 
thereof) comprising eight of the eleven key terms in the Intellectual 
Property Clause. Recall that the Intellectual Property Clause sets forth both 
the copyright and patent powers of Congress.83 The eleven key terms of the 
Intellectual Property Clause consist of the following: promote, Progress, 
Science, useful Arts, securing, limited Times, Authors, Inventors, exclusive 
Right, Writings, Discoveries.84 Of these, the key terms not mentioned in 
their proposals are Writings, Inventors, and Progress.85 Although Writings 
and Inventors do not appear in the proposals, their analogues do: authors 
and inventions. Authors (found in the proposals) create writings (not found 
in the proposals) just as inventors (not found in the proposals) create 
inventions (found in the proposals). Thus, two of the three terms not in the 
proposals (Writings and Inventors) follow naturally from the meanings of 
terms in the proposals (Authors and inventions). The only term not 
referenced in the proposals (either by specific mention or by analogue) is 
Progress. Yet like Writings and Inventors, Progress does have a 
corresponding term in the proposals: advancement. The term advancement 
is found in Madison’s proposal, “the advancement of useful knowledge and 
discoveries.”86 And as discussed in the section above, advancement was 
one of the meanings for progress at the time of the Framing.87 It is 
therefore reasonable to conclude that Progress in the Copyright Clause 
 
80.  DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 
563–64 (Charles Tansill ed. 1927) [hereinafter FORMATION OF THE UNION]. 
81.  Id. at 564. 
82.  Id. at 563. 
83.  The Intellectual Property Clause states that Congress shall have power “To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also 
discussion supra Part II (explaining that the Copyright Clause derives from the Intellectual Property 
Clause). 
84.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. I do not consider the word respective to be a key 
substantive term because it merely provides structure to the substantive key terms within the Intellectual 
Property Clause. 
85.  See FORMATION OF THE UNION, supra note 80, at 563–64. 
86.  Id. at 563. 
87.  See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a. 
1 SNOW 583-633 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2016  8:34 AM 
2016] Discrimination in the Copyright Clause 599 
 
means advancement in view of the following three facts: first, advancement 
was a meaning for progress at the time; second, the term advancement 
appears in one of Madison’s proposals where progress could have 
otherwise appeared; and third, every other key term in the Intellectual 
Property Clause is found in those proposals.88 
Further evidence that Progress means advancement is apparent from 
the structure and meanings of words within one of Madison’s proposals: 
specifically, “To encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement of 
useful knowledge and discoveries.”89 Structurally, Madison’s phrase “the 
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries” has the same 
grammatical arrangement as the phrase “the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts,” with advancement corresponding to the placement of Progress in 
that arrangement. Also with regard to structure, Madison’s proposal sets 
forth a means (“by premiums and provisions”) to accomplish an end (“the 
advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries”). This is the only 
proposal of either Madison or Pinckney that employs a means–ends 
structure, similar to the ends–means structure of the Intellectual Property 
Clause.90 Within the ends portion of Madison’s proposal (“the advancement 
of useful knowledge and discoveries”) and the ends portion of the 
Intellectual Property Clause (“To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts”) are corresponding word meanings: useful knowledge in 
Madison’s proposal corresponds to the meaning of Science, and discoveries 
in Madison’s proposal corresponds to useful Arts, the focus of patent.91 
These corresponding meanings appear in the same order in the ends 
portions of both Madison’s proposal and the Intellectual Property Clause. 
So because advancement in Madison’s proposal appears in the same order 
as Progress in the Clause, advancement appears to have the same meaning 
as Progress as well—just like the corresponding order and meanings of the 
other words in the ends portions of Madison’s proposal and the Intellectual 
Property Clause. Thus, the history of the Constitutional Convention 
suggests that Progress means advancement. 
 
88.  Ironically, then, Madison appears to have elucidated the meaning of Progress in the 
Copyright Clause by failing to include the word in his proposal. 
89.  See FORMATION OF THE UNION, supra note 80, at 563. 
90.  The ends portion of the Copyright Clause is found in the initial phrase, “To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts”; the means for accomplishing those ends are found in the 
remainder of the Copyright Clause “by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
91.  See Snow, supra note 38, at 306; Oliar, supra note 30, at 1798, 1809. 
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iii. Writings of Madison 
Writings of James Madison should be considered in examining the 
meaning of Progress because Madison was the only member of the 
constitutional committee that drafted the verbiage of the Copyright Clause 
who also proposed the copyright power.92 Given this fact, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that Madison likely had the greatest influence on 
the wording of the Clause. 
In a letter to Archibald Stuart, a fellow politician from Virginia, 
Madison referred to progress as it relates to a particular science: “The 
diversity of opinions on so interesting a subject, among men of equal 
integrity & discernment, is at once a melancholy proof of the fallibility of 
the human judgment, and of the imperfect progress yet made in the science 
of Government.”93 This use is particularly noteworthy because Madison 
employed progress in the context of describing a science, similar to the 
Copyright Clause’s employment of Progress to describe Science. 
Specifically, Madison explained that diverse opinions lead to imperfect 
progress in the science of government. The progress that one would 
associate with the science of government seems more likely to suggest 
improvements or advancements in government (advancement interpretation 
of Progress) than the spread of government (spread interpretation of 
Progress). Indeed, it seems clear that Madison employed progress here to 
suggest a qualitative improvement or advancement—not a spread. 
Other writings of Madison suggest the same meaning of progress. In 
another letter to Archibald Stuart, Madison referred to the progress of the 
new constitutional government as follows: “It is impossible indeed to trace 
the progress and tendency of this fond experiment without perceiving 
difficulty and danger in every Stage of it.”94 To Thomas Jefferson, Madison 
wrote about the confederation as a feudality of republics, each with its own 
constitution, and asked about the progress of that system: “And what has 
been the progress and event of the feudal Constitutions? In all of them a 
continual struggle between the head and the inferior members . . . .”95 
Although neither of these uses of progress directly refers to Science or 
knowledge, they refer to democratic government, which, in Madison’s 
 
92.  See Snow, supra note 38, at 289–90 (detailing history of Madison at the Constitutional 
Convention and his involvement in passing the Virginia copyright statute). 
93.  Letter from James Madison to Archibald Stuart (Oct. 30, 1787), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 135, 135 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1988) 
[hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
94.  Letter from James Madison to Archibald Stuart (Dec. 14, 1787), in 8 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 93, at 237, 238 (emphasis added). 
95.  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 8 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 93, at 97, 101 (emphasis added). 
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view, likely reflected a product of the knowledge that arose through the 
Enlightenment.96 And both these examples show his use of progress to 
suggest a qualitative improvement. 
Thus, the meaning of Progress in the Progress of Science of the 
Copyright Clause suggests a qualitative improvement or advancement in 
science. This means that the assumption is reasonable that the copyright 
power provides Congress a power to promote a qualitative end. And that 
assumption supports my argument that Congress has a power to direct 
authors to content that is likely to promote a qualitative end. In short, the 
power to promote the qualitative end of progress in science suggests power 
to designate content that will best effectuate such an end. 
3. Science as Restricting Progress 
Although the meaning of Progress appears to provide Congress 
discretion to make qualitative decisions about copyrightable content, the 
meaning of Science appears to restrain that discretion. Progress is relative 
to the meaning Science.97 The Progress Clause restricts the expansive 
meaning of progress to a specific subject matter—science.98 This means, 
then, that Congress may not employ the copyright power for the purpose of 
promoting progress in some other subject, such as commerce. Congress 
may promote only that progress which specifically pertains to science. The 
term Science in the Progress Clause restricts Congress’s discriminatory 
power of promoting progress. 
Of course, in grammar and perhaps in theory the term Science may be 
restrictive of the term Progress in the Progress Clause, but what does this 
mean as a practical matter? How does Science actually restrict Congress’s 
power to discriminate in deciding copyrightable content? The answer is 
twofold: first, Science precludes Congress from exercising viewpoint 
discrimination in defining copyright; and second, Science precludes 
Congress from granting copyright to certain categories of content. These 
conclusions follow from the meaning of Science, which I discuss below. 
Courts and scholars recognize the meaning of Science as knowledge or 
learning.99 That knowledge or learning, however, does not denote cognitive 
 
96.  See generally I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 267–68 (1995) 
(explaining Madison’s view of science as a product of the Enlightenment). 
97.  See 2 PATRY, supra note 30, § 3:6 (observing that Progress must refer to something that may 
be advanced or encouraged). 
98.  Indeed, Congress’s power to promote progress is not unrestricted, in contrast to Congress’s 
power to promote general welfare. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, with id. cl. 1. 
99.  See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) (“The ‘Progress of Science,’ 
petitioners acknowledge, refers broadly to ‘the creation and spread of knowledge and learning.’”); 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (explaining the public benefit of copyright as “the 
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awareness of anything.100 As I have written in another article, Science in 
the Progress Clause means knowledge and learning that arises through the 
process of reason and experience, ultimately leading to truth.101 The 
advancements of science follow from trial and error, as well as from reason 
and logic.102 And progress in science necessarily follows from, and only 
from, the method of science. This is important because it means that 
Congress’s attempts to promote progress in science must accord with this 
general process of gaining knowledge through reason and experience. More 
specifically, it means that Congress cannot dictate which particular views 
represent truth or effect worthwhile outcomes.103 Congress could not, for 
instance, grant copyright only to views that promote the Republican party. 
This would not accord with the method of science. Science would require a 
diversity of viewpoints, with a time for testing, so that the best viewpoint 
could prevail. Competition among viewpoints, with trial and error, reflects 
the method of science.104 As a result, Science precludes Congress from 
using its copyright power to favor particular viewpoints. So while the term 
Progress enables Congress to choose which subject-matter categories to 
promote, the term Science restricts Congress from passing judgment on 
specific ideas or views. 
The meaning of Science also may restrict Congress from granting 
copyright to some specific categories of content. Just as when Congress 
exercises any other congressional power,105 Congress’s judgment about 
whether a category of content will promote progress in science must be 
 
proliferation of knowledge” which would “ensure[] the progress of science”); id. at 243 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (explaining undisputed premise that by “‘Science’ . . . the Framers meant learning or 
knowledge”); 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 123 (1994) (“The term ‘science’ 
as used in the Constitution refers to the eighteenth-century concept of learning and knowledge.”); L. 
RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 
48 (1991) (“[T]he word science retains its eighteenth-century meaning of ‘knowledge or learning.’”); 
O’Connor, supra note 79, at 778–79, 784 (“Thus, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the basic 
ideas of ‘art’ and ‘science’ were entrenched. ‘Science’ meant the ‘systematic study’ of anything. ‘Art’ 
meant the manipulation of changeable aspects of the world.”); Snow, supra note 38, at 265 (listing 
courts and commentators interpreting the constitutional purpose of copyright as mandating an increase 
in knowledge). 
100.  See Snow, supra note 38, at 317. 
101.  See id. 
102.  See 1 JOHNSON, supra note 65 (unpaginated) (defining science as “Certainty grounded on 
demonstration”); Snow, supra note 38, at 277–78 (describing reason and experience as part of the 
process of science at the Framing). 
103.  The Free Speech Clause also restricts Congress from extending copyright to specific 
viewpoints. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”); Snow, supra note 3, at 1517–18. 
104.  For a discussion on how content-based copyright denial furthers the marketplace of ideas 
theory of free speech, see Snow, supra note 3, at 1504–09. 
105.  See generally United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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reasonable.106 That is, Congress’s judgment about granting copyright to a 
category of content must bear a rational relationship to the improvement of 
knowledge and learning.107 Under this rational-basis standard for judging 
Congress’s discretionary acts, the question arises whether it would be 
unreasonable to grant copyright for particular categories of content. That is: 
are some categories of content so contrary to the progress of science that it 
would be unreasonable for Congress to grant them a copyright? Perhaps.108 
 
106.  See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–22 (2003) (rejecting higher level of 
scrutiny in examining changes to Copyright Act). 
107.  Cf. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) (seemingly applying a rational-basis review 
of amendment to Copyright Act). 
108.  The expansive subject matter of knowledge or learning, as well as the subjective standards 
necessary to determine improvement and advancement, arguably suggests that courts might not be able 
to apply any meaningful criteria to determine whether Congress’s choice is unreasonable. The scope of 
knowledge and learning seems unbounded, and the standard of improvement and advancement seems to 
depend on subjective opinion. All content enables audiences to learn something—even if only the 
existence of the content itself—and all content turns on subjective opinion as to whether it effects 
advancements and improvements in knowledge. Therefore, Progress of Science could be construed as 
allowing Congress to grant or deny copyright to any content on the grounds that—in Congress’s view—
the content does or does not advance the general store of knowledge. Thus, at first glance, the 
Copyright Clause does not seem to provide any meaningful standard against which to determine 
whether Congress has acted reasonably in granting or denying copyright. 
This conclusion begs history and precedent. As I have written elsewhere, history well establishes 
content-based boundaries to the Copyright Clause. See Snow, supra note 30, at 6–33. In 1790, the first 
Copyright Act was content neutral, extending protection to “map[s], chart[s], . . . or books.” See 
Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (amended 1831). Yet the public sought copyright protection 
mostly for scholastic and instructional works. See Snow, supra note 38, at 300–03. Fictional works 
were noticeably underrepresented, suggesting a public understanding that the scope of the Copyright 
Clause was fairly narrow in content. Id. Similarly, in 1829 a Supreme Court Justice, sitting by 
designation in the Southern District of New York, opined that Congress’s copyright authority extended 
only to content that exhibited a “fixed, permanent and durable character,” and on that basis, denied 
copyright protection for a daily publication on the stock market. See Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 
1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1829) (Thompson, J.). The Supreme Court later recited this limited scope of the 
Copyright Clause in the 1879 case of Baker v. Selden. See 101 U.S. 99, 105–06 (1879). Early copyright 
history thus indicates that much content would not have reasonably fallen within the meaning of 
promoting the progress of science. 
As cultural values changed over time, the scope of copyrightable content expanded. Snow, supra note 
30, at 10–33. The categories of content that could reasonably be construed as promoting progress in 
science expanded with shifts in cultural understandings of value in content. Id. Continuing to extend 
protection to the full extent of the Copyright Clause, Congress extended copyright protection to all 
content categories that could reasonably be construed as promoting progress in science. Id. Courts, in 
turn, recognized copyright protection in entertainment, advertisements, and personal letters, which 
content would not have been copyrightable under earlier applications of the Copyright Clause. See id. 
What could reasonably be thought to improve or advance knowledge and learning dramatically 
increased over time. See id. 
Despite this increase in coverage, for most of the twentieth century courts refrained from recognizing 
that the Copyright Clause extended to pornographic works. See id. Congress’s silence on whether 
protection extended to such works indicated that courts, in denying copyright to pornography, viewed 
such content as falling outside the scope of content that could reasonably be construed as promoting 
progress in science. See id. As one court stated, 
[C]ongress is not empowered by the constitution to pass laws for the protection or benefit of 
authors and inventors, except as a means of promoting the progress of ‘science and useful 
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Some categories of content may be so contrary to cultural understandings 
of promoting progress that they cannot reasonably fall within the scope of 
copyrightable works. An example might be unprotected speech, such as 
libel.109 Similarly, protected speech that the culture generally recognizes as 
lacking value might lie outside the boundaries of copyrightable subject 
matter, such as hate speech,110 pornography,111 or crime-facilitating 
speech.112 Although I do not argue the merits of such specific examples 
here, I do observe the possibility that Science might restrict Congress from 
extending copyright to some categories of content.113 And more practically 
speaking, the terms Progress and Science provide Congress ample 
authority to deny copyright for these examples of content. Such content 
could reasonably be construed as failing to promote improvements in 
knowledge and learning. 
In sum, Progress of Science indicates that Congress may decide which 
general category of content may be copyrighted, and the public decides the 
success or demise of the viewpoints within that content. 
B. History of Congress 
This section examines the history of Congress practicing content 
discrimination in extending copyright. This history is relevant because, if 
existent, it would serve as evidence that the Constitution gives Congress 
 
arts.’ . . . [A] dramatic composition which is grossly indecent, and calculated to corrupt the 
morals of the people . . . neither ‘promotes the progress of science or useful arts,’ but the 
contrary. 
Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (No. 9173) (C.C.D. Cal. 1867). Some content, including 
pornographic and libelous works, would be unreasonable to construe as promoting progress in science. 
See id. This view was challenged, however, in 1979. In Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult 
Theater, the Fifth Circuit held that pornography, and specifically legal obscenity, was reasonable to 
construe as promoting progress in science. 604 F.2d 852, 854–60 (5th Cir. 1979). The Mitchell court did 
not, however, declare that Congress could copyright any and all content, or alternatively, declare that 
Congress must copyright all content. See id. Rather, the court asked whether it was reasonable for 
Congress to grant copyright to legal obscenity. Id. at 860 (“We cannot say this judgment was so 
unreasonable as to exceed congressional power.”). Thus, history teaches that Congress’s decision to 
copyright content is subject to an inquiry as to whether content could reasonably promote the progress 
of science. And that inquiry is subject to changing cultural values. 
109.  See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (opining that some 
expression has “such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] 
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality”). 
110.  See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 8, at 45. 
111.  See infra notes 215, 216 and accompanying text. 
112.  See Volokh, supra note 8, at 1217. 
113.  See Snow, supra note 30, at 56–61 (“Simply put, the [Progress] Clause limits Congress in 
extending copyright to that which promotes Progress, but no more than that.”) (contemplating narrow 
and obvious limits of copyright protection, and citing hate speech, extremely violent video games, 
gambling software, and pornography as possible examples of content falling outside the scope of the 
Progress Clause). 
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the power to perform that action.114 With regard to the history of Congress 
extending copyright based on content, from one perspective Congress has 
done so for several decades.115 Since its enactment in 1976, the present 
Copyright Act has barred copyright for ideas, and as an extension of ideas, 
facts also have not received copyright.116 Congress has also denied 
copyright for expression that is not original, lacking sufficient creativity.117 
Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, these exceptions of idea, fact, and 
originality existed as matters of constitutional and common law, dating 
back into the nineteenth century.118 Importantly, these exceptions to 
copyright require an examination of content to determine whether 
expression contains ideas, facts, and originality.119 They require courts to 
examine what an author is saying. It might seem, then, that this lengthy 
history of determining copyright eligibility based on content suggests that 
Congress may continue to do so using other criteria that examine content—
pornography120 and violent video games, for instance.121 
 
114.  See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003) (reciting long history of Congress 
granting authors term extensions on existing works as evidence of constitutionality of act). 
115.  See Baker, supra note 45, at 922 (“[C]opyright laws involve content-based suppression of 
speech in the simplest and most direct sense.”); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech 
and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 186 (1998) (“Copyright liability 
turns on the content of what is published.”). 
116.  See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, § 102(b), 90 Stat. 2541, 2545 (codified at 17 
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012)); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) 
(indicating that copyright’s restriction against copyrighting ideas also restricts copyrighting facts). 
117.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102; Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344–50 
(1991). Perhaps more subtly, Congress appears to have exercised content discrimination in extending 
copyright protection through the fair-use doctrine. Fair use calls for greater copyright protection for 
works that are more creative in nature. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012). Specifically, the second factor in 
the fair-use doctrine considers whether the original work is creative, or alternatively, factual in nature. 
Id. (examining “the nature of the copyrighted work”); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563–64 (explaining 
that the second fair-use factor distinguishes between “factual works” and “works of fiction or fantasy”); 
Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 200 (3d Cir. 2003) (relying on 
Harper & Row’s interpretation of the second fair-use factor to draw a distinction between creative 
works and factual works). 
118.  See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58 (1884) (explaining 
originality doctrine as constitutional requirement); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1879) 
(exempting process idea from copyright protection). 
119.  See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 50 (2001) (recognizing that “on a broad, macro level copyright law might be seen to 
discriminate out of concern for communicative impact” because it favors original over nonoriginal 
expression). 
120.  See Bartow, supra note 9, at 19–25 (arguing that because much of copyright law determines 
rights based on content, Congress barring protection for pornography would be consistent with existent 
content-based discriminators in copyright). 
121.  Consistent with the interpretation of Science in Part II.A.3 above, the sort of content 
discrimination that Congress has exercised through these discriminators has not included viewpoint 
discrimination. Congress’s past practice of content discrimination suggests the power to target only 
general categories of content—not viewpoints. The discriminators of idea, fact, and originality are 
themselves so abstract from the actual content that they do not approach the specific ideas contained 
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It might be argued that although these discriminators of idea, fact, and 
originality call for an examination of content, they are not altogether 
persuasive to conclude that Congress’s existent practice of content 
discrimination suggests its power to target other categories of content. The 
Supreme Court has held that the Copyright Clause itself mandates the idea, 
fact, and originality doctrines.122 Hence, the presence of these 
discriminators in the Copyright Act represents a codification of 
constitutional requirements—not a choice by Congress. It is unclear, then, 
that these content-based discriminators establish a history of Congress (as 
distinct from the Constitution) choosing content-based categories to 
promote. 
Congress has, however, exercised content discrimination in defining 
copyright eligibility without a constitutional obligation to do so. For 
decades, Congress has denied copyright to expression that functions as a 
useful article, where aesthetic design cannot be distinguished from 
utilitarian function.123 Mannequins, for instance, are non-copyrightable 
useful articles because their expressive elements cannot be distinguished 
from their utilitarian function.124 The useful-article doctrine could be 
construed as a statutory denial of copyright for content that serves a useful 
purpose. 
Similarly, Congress has adjusted the rights of copyright holders based 
on categories of content. Specifically, Congress has designated that 
nondramatic musical works are subject to a compulsory licensing 
scheme,125 that sound recordings lack a right of public performance,126 that 
certain visual arts have moral rights,127 and that photographs of buildings 
that are visible to the public do not violate the copyright in the building’s 
 
within the content. Cf. Netanel, supra note 119, at 50 (viewing copyright’s “broad-brush concern with 
communicative impact” as analogous to a structural regularity designed to promote expressive diversity 
and widespread availability). Because the fact, idea, and originality discriminators are sufficiently 
abstract from the content—encompassing content that is so wide-ranging—Congress is not targeting 
specific viewpoints through these discriminators. That said, Professor Tushnet aptly observes that 
copyright does cause systematic effects on content and viewpoint. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a 
Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign 
Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 49 (2000). 
122.  See Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 349–51. With respect to content examination in fair use, see 
supra note 117, the Supreme Court has observed that fair use represents a doctrine with “speech-
protective purposes and safeguards,” thereby ostensibly required by the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–19 (2003). 
123.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
124.  Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985); cf. Kieselstein-
Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993–94 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that design of belt 
buckle to be copyrightable on grounds that the design is conceptually separable from functionality). 
125.  See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012). 
126.  See id. § 106. 
127.  See id. § 106A. 
1 SNOW 583-633 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2016  8:34 AM 
2016] Discrimination in the Copyright Clause 607 
 
architecture.128 Arguably these criteria indicate a pattern of content 
discrimination by Congress. 
Yet these criteria are not entirely persuasive that Congress has a history 
of exercising content discrimination. To begin with, the useful-article 
doctrine may be distinguished from the sort of discriminators that this 
Article contemplates. The useful-article doctrine exists to prevent copyright 
from interfering with the domain of patent—not to discourage the 
production of useful articles.129 Arguably, the useful-article doctrine is 
permissible as a division between copyright and patent, as distinct from a 
discriminator that discourages the production of certain content. 
As for the other content-based criteria mentioned, they, too, seem weak 
evidence of Congress having exercised the sort of content discrimination 
that this Article contemplates. The discriminators mentioned—nondramatic 
musical works, sound recordings, visual arts, photographs of buildings—
seem to discriminate based more on form than on subject-matter content. 
Congress has designated forms of copyrightable content since the original 
1790 Copyright Act, which specified protection only for “map[s], 
chart[s] . . . or books.”130 Similarly, the 1909 Act designated the following 
categories for which protection existed: 
(a) Books, including composite and cyclopædic works, directories, 
gazetteers, and other compilations; 
(b) Periodicals, including newspapers; 
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses, prepared for oral delivery; 
(d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; 
(e) Musical compositions; 
(f) Maps; 
(g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art; 
(h) Reproductions of a work of art; 
(i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character; 
(j) Photographs; 
(k) Prints and pictorial illustrations.131 
Likewise, the current 1976 Copyright Act lists similar categories of 
protection.132 So on the one hand, such categories do call for an 
 
128.  See id. § 120. 
129.  See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). 
130.  Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (amended 1831). 
131.  Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076–77 (repealed 
1976). 
132.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (extending copyright protection to “(1) literary works; (2) musical 
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) 
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examination of content: a court must examine expression to judge whether 
it does in fact constitute a designated category. On the other hand, the 
categories may be viewed as representing mere forms of expression. For 
instance, an author’s sentiments might be expressed through a book, a 
musical composition, a sermon, a photograph, or a work of art. The 
designated categories might indicate different formats to engage in 
expression. Viewed in this light, the categories do not seem to target 
subject matter as much as they seem to recognize means through which an 
author expresses content. They seem to focus more on how a work is 
expressed more than they focus on what is being expressed. They thus 
seem weak support of historical evidence where Congress has exercised 
content discrimination. 
The sort of content discrimination that this Article contemplates is rare, 
where Congress has excluded specific content from copyright protection 
either in an attempt to decrease content production or in recognition that 
content simply fails to promote progress. But instances do seem to exist. In 
1856, when Congress introduced the right to perform dramatic 
compositions, Congress described the right as applying to works “suited for 
public representation.”133 Arguably, the word “suited” suggests that 
dramatic compositions must comprise suitable content to be 
copyrightable.134 This interpretation, of course, is weak. Congress provided 
no guidance as to the meaning of suited, and moreover, the word appears 
only in a passing description of dramatic compositions.135 
In 1874, Congress specified that engravings, cuts, and prints were 
copyrightable only if they were “pictorial illustrations or works connected 
with the fine arts.”136 In the same sentence, Congress continued: “no prints 
or labels designed to be used for any other article of manufacture shall be 
entered under the copyright law.”137 Hence, in two instances of the 1874 
Act Congress referred to types of content ineligible for copyright. 
Nevertheless, Congress removed the discriminatory language in passing the 
1909 Copyright Act.138 
 
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures 
and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works”). 
133.  Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139 (repealed 1870). 
134.  See Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922–23 (No. 9173) (C.C.D. Cal. 1867). 
135.  Nevertheless, one court construed that word to suggest that Congress intended that dramatic 
compositions be eligible for copyright only if they adhered to a moral standard. See id. 
136.  Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, 18 Stat. pt. 3 78, 79 (repealed 1909). 
137.  Id. 
138.  See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976). 
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To sum up, in exercising its copyright power, Congress has a history of 
employing content discriminators.139 And this fact may serve as evidence 
that the Copyright Clause enables Congress to target specific content. But 
the support is lacking in some respects. The idea, fact, and originality 
content discriminators are (according to the Court) required by the 
Copyright Clause; the useful-article discriminator allocates property rights 
between copyright and patent law; other categories of content that 
Congress has designated seem to target form rather than content. The only 
instances where Congress seems to have targeted content consist of two 
mere blips during the nineteenth century. Thus, support for content-based 
content discrimination draws mixed support from Congress’s history.140 
 
139.  Congress’s power to define copyright eligibility draws indirect support from its history of 
content discrimination in the areas of patent law. Congress’s patent power arises in the same 
constitutional clause as its copyright power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing Congress the 
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). That patent power 
enables Congress to incentivize expression that discloses inventions. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) 
(requiring a written description of invention to receive a patent). Under that power, Congress has 
legislated to discourage the expression of certain content by denying patent protection for inventions 
directed toward human organisms, see Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 
§ 634, 118 Stat. 3, 101, and for inventions relating to nuclear energy or atomic bombs, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2181(a) (2012) (originally enacted as Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 11, 60 Stat. 755, 768–
70). More recently, Congress has denied patent protection for “any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or 
deferring tax liability.” 35 U.S.C. § 102 note (2012) (Tax Strategies Deemed Within the Prior Art). 
Admittedly, the focus of Congress’s patent power is distinct from its copyright power. See Graham v. 
John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (recognizing that the focus of patent law is “useful 
Arts” in the Intellectual Property Clause). Patent exists to encourage new, useful, and nonobvious 
inventions, see 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, content discrimination in patent law does not necessitate the 
conclusion that content discrimination in copyright is permissible. Yet patent law is relevant to a certain 
extent because it demonstrates Congress discouraging certain categories of content by denying a 
subsidy under the Intellectual Property Clause. Hence, denying rights to discourage content does not 
reflect an unprecedented use of Congress’s intellectual property power. 
140.  At least one federal circuit has interpreted Congress’s silence on copyrightable content as a 
choice that all content should be copyrighted. See Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 
604 F.2d 852, 854–58 (5th Cir. 1979). The Mitchell court viewed Congress as refraining from 
exercising its existent power to discriminate based on content. Id.; see also Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 
F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1982) (agreeing with the Mitchell court’s reasoning that Congress’s silence 
suggests a choice not to exercise its content-discriminatory power). 
Relevant to the history of Congress exercising content discrimination are any congressional actions 
directed toward patent, which arise under the Copyright Clause. If Congress has practiced content 
discrimination in defining patent eligibility, this fact might suggest that Congress may also do so in 
defining copyright eligibility. It is debatable, however, whether content discrimination in patent would 
raise the same speech issues as copyright, given that the subject matter of patent is directed to objects or 
processes rather than speech. Putting aside that issue, patent history does not indicate a lengthy practice 
of discrimination that is not abstract (unlike the requirements for utility, novelty, non-obviousness) or 
that is for the purpose of discouraging the production of particular works. See 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
Congress has only recently introduced a content-based criterion in patent law—a preclusion for patents 
directed to human organisms. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 634, 
118 Stat. 3, 101. Since 1946, however, Congress has precluded the patentability of inventions relating 
to nuclear energy or atomic bombs—an ostensible content-based restriction. See 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) 
(2012) (originally enacted as Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 11, 60 Stat. 755, 768–70). But that 
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C. Supreme Court Statements 
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of 
whether the Copyright Clause allows Congress to discriminate in extending 
copyright for the purpose of discouraging certain content. It has, however, 
made statements that may shed light on this issue, both in the older case of 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.141 and the more modern cases of 
Eldred v. Ashcroft142 and Golan v. Holder.143 This section examines those 
cases. 
1. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 
Perhaps the most influential opinion on the subject of content 
discrimination in copyright is the Supreme Court’s decision in Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co.144 Writing for the majority, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., set forth a nondiscrimination principle that precluded 
a determination of copyright eligibility based on a work’s content.145 The 
issue under consideration was simple: whether the apparent lack of artistic 
value in circus posters precluded their eligibility for copyright protection.146 
Holding that they were eligible for copyright, Holmes preached against 
content discrimination.147 He applied this principle to the governing 
Copyright Act, which specified that engravings, cuts, or prints were 
copyrightable only if they constituted “pictorial illustrations or works 
connected with the fine arts.”148 That same Act denied copyright for “prints 
or labels designed to be used for any other articles of manufacture.”149 
Holmes read fine arts to mean anything that Congress had not specifically 
exempted, i.e., “prints or labels designed to be used for any other articles of 
manufacture.”150 If fine arts were construed to mean anything else, Holmes 
 
action seems necessary to carry out its power to “provide for the Common Defence and general Welfare 
of the United States.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 18. Hence, the common-defense power appears 
to justify the content-based restriction that Congress imposed in exercising its patent power under the 
Copyright Clause. Congress’s history of discriminatory action in patent thereby provides only weak 
evidence in support of the argument for a power to discriminate in exercising its copyright power under 
the Copyright Clause. 
141.  188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
142.  537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
143.  132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
144.  188 U.S. 239. 
145.  Id. at 251–52. 
146.  Id. at 248. 
147.  See id. at 251–52. 
148.  Id. at 250 (quoting Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, 18 Stat. pt. 3 78, 79 (repealed 1909)). 
149.  Id. at 251 (quoting Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, 18 Stat. pt. 3 78, 79 (repealed 1909)). 
150.  Id. (quoting Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, 18 Stat. pt. 3 78, 79 (repealed 1909)). 
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taught, then great works would surely go unappreciated.151 Content 
discrimination was an evil to be avoided at all costs.152 
Some commentators may read the nondiscrimination principle in 
Bleistein as suggesting that Congress lacks authority to discriminate under 
the Copyright Clause. But this would be incorrect. Holmes directed his 
warning to judges—not Congress.153 He specifically directed his most 
famous articulation of the nondiscrimination principle to the Judiciary: “It 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, 
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”154 Persons trained only 
to the law are judges—not members of Congress, who come from all walks 
of life. Holmes further specified to whom he was directing this admonition 
in his subsequent sentences: “At the one extreme, some works of genius 
would be sure to miss appreciation. . . . At the other end, copyright would 
be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the 
judge.”155 The judge, then, is the actor against whom Holmes warned of 
failing to appreciate works of genius or overlooking the public’s 
preference. It is the Judiciary for which Holmes’s warning is meant—not 
Congress. 
Holmes’s language also makes clear that Congress may discriminate. 
In articulating the principle that originality is found in every expression, 
Holmes stated: “[Personality] expresses its singularity even in handwriting, 
and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one 
man’s alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction 
in the words of the act.”156 According to Holmes, then, Congress may 
restrict expression that is eligible for copyright. Tellingly, in articulating 
this principle of restriction, Holmes was careful to specify that the 
restriction must come from “the words of the act,” which can only be 
interpreted as a choice by Congress—not by judges.157 Congress is the only 
institution that Holmes recognized as having authority to restrict the scope 
of copyright. 
Of course this language does not indicate whether such congressional 
discrimination may be based on content or not. But other language in the 
Bleistein opinion does. Holmes recognized a content-based restriction when 
he endorsed the validity of Congress’s choice to deny copyright for “prints 
 
151.  Id. at 251–52. 
152.  See id. 
153.  See id. at 251–52. 
154.  Id. at 251 (emphasis added). 
155.  Id. at 251–52 (emphasis added). 
156.  Id. at 250 (emphasis added). 
157.  See id. 
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or labels designed to be used for any other articles of manufacture.”158 The 
restriction targets specific content, and Holmes adhered to that 
congressional choice.159 So just as Holmes is known for deferring to 
Congress in other matters, copyright is no different.160 Congress may 
discriminate on content; judges may not—so taught Holmes in Bleistein. 
Given that Holmes respected Congress’s discretion not to copyright 
certain content, the question arises: Why didn’t Holmes adhere to 
Congress’s choice to deny copyright for pictorial works that were not 
connected with the fine arts? If Holmes adhered to congressional 
discrimination over content relating to articles of manufacture, why not 
over content relating to the fine arts? The answer is simple. It’s much easier 
to identify prints that are designed for an article of manufacture than prints 
that are fine art. In Holmes’s view, fine art is simply art that its beholder 
prefers, so the fine arts restriction would introduce unfettered judicial 
discretion into questions of copyright eligibility.161 There would not be any 
intelligible principle for judges to objectively apply in determining which 
prints were copyrightable.162 At bottom, then, Holmes appeared concerned 
with an unconstitutional delegation of power from Congress to the courts. 
Congress has authority to exercise its qualitative judgment to determine 
that which promotes progress. But the Judiciary does not. Hence, Holmes’s 
concern echoes the modern nondelegation doctrine, which the Supreme 
Court eventually articulated after Bleistein while Holmes was still on the 
Court.163 In Bleistein, Holmes simply foretold the evil of Congress failing 
 
158.  See id. at 251. 
159.  See id. 
160.  See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[The 
Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding 
certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment 
upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United 
States.”); Otis & Gassman v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903) (opining that only a “clear, unmistakable 
infringement of rights secured by the fundamental law” would justify a court interfering with legislative 
law) (quoting Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425, 429 (1902)); JEREMY COHEN, CONGRESS SHALL MAKE 
NO LAW: OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 70 
(1989) (explaining that Holmes believed the court justified in interfering with a legislative law only if 
that law constituted an explicit violation of the Constitution); DORSEY RICHARDSON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOCTRINES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 20–22 (1924) (observing Holmes’s restrictive view 
of the Court in reviewing legislative law). 
161.  See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251–52. 
162.  Cf. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) (articulating intelligible-principle 
requirement in nondelegation doctrine, stating that “Congress does not violate the Constitution merely 
because it legislates in broad terms, leaving a certain degree of discretion to executive or judicial actors. 
So long as Congress ‘lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to [act] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of 
legislative power.’” (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))). 
163.  J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); see also Touby, 500 
U.S. at 164–65 (“Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of 
Government.”). 
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to offer the Judiciary any intelligible principle in applying the power of 
content discrimination. 
Bleistein should, therefore, not be read to preclude Congress from 
engaging in content discrimination. If anything, Bleistein tacitly calls for 
Congress to be specific in exercising content discrimination—as specific as 
“prints or labels designed to be used for articles of manufacture” rather 
than the more general “fine arts.” Or for that matter, “graphically violent 
video games” rather than “offensive entertainment.” So noted. 
2. Eldred v. Ashcroft and Golan v. Holder 
The modern Supreme Court has made statements that might be 
interpreted as either allowing or precluding Congress from exercising 
content discrimination in defining copyright. These statements have arisen 
in the cases of Eldred v. Ashcroft164 and Golan v. Holder.165 
a. Support for Content Discrimination 
Under one interpretation, these modern Supreme Court decisions 
would be consistent with construing the Copyright Clause as providing 
Congress the power to exercise content discrimination. In both Eldred and 
Golan, the Court made clear that Congress may do what it pleases in 
crafting copyright policy.166 In Eldred, the Court considered the Copyright 
Term Extension Act (CTEA), where Congress extended the term of 
copyright an additional twenty years and applied that extension to works 
that had already been created under the previous term.167 In Golan, the 
Court considered the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), where 
Congress had re-copyrighted works that had already entered the public 
domain.168 In both cases, the Court held that Congress had acted within the 
scope of the Copyright Clause.169 
These cases exemplify the extent to which the Court defers to 
congressional judgment in setting copyright policy. Both in extending the 
term of existing works (Eldred) and in taking works out of the public 
domain (Golan), Congress had retroactively extended copyright, suggesting 
 
164.  537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
165.  132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
166.  See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 (“[T]he [Copyright] Clause ‘empowers Congress to determine 
the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the 
Clause.’”) (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222)). 
167.  537 U.S. at 192–93. 
168.  132 S. Ct. at 878–79. 
169.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194. 
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the practical possibility of a perpetual copyright.170 Such an outcome seems 
contrary to the Copyright Clause’s restraint that copyrights must exist only 
for “limited Times.”171 Nevertheless, the Court deferred to Congress’s 
judgment, holding the acts to be rationally related to promoting the 
Progress of Science.172 The Eldred Court explained: 
[W]e turn now to whether it is a rational exercise of the legislative 
authority conferred by the Copyright Clause. On that point, we 
defer substantially to Congress. . . . [W]e are not at liberty to 
second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments 
of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may 
be. . . . [I]t is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how 
best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives. . . . [T]he 
Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual 
property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve 
the ends of the Clause.173 
Thus, Eldred made clear that the Court greatly defers to Congress’s 
judgment as it pursues copyright policies.174 
Adding to this argument is the Golan Court’s explanation that 
promoting the Progress of Science does not necessarily entail incentivizing 
new works.175 Purposes other than incentivizing new works promote 
progress, taught the Court.176 The purpose under consideration was 
Congress’s attempt to conform to an international agreement, which 
necessitated re-copyrighting works in the public domain.177 According to 
the Golan Court, that purpose promoted progress because a well-
functioning international copyright system might induce greater investment 
in creativity in the United States.178 The purpose thereby indirectly 
promoted progress. Hence, the Golan Court recognized that even indirect 
 
170.  See Howard B. Abrams, Eldred, Golan, and Their Aftermath, J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A., 
Summer 2013, at 491, 495–98. 
171.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (defining the means of promoting the Progress of Science 
as “securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings” (emphasis added)); Abrams, supra note 170, at 495–98. 
172.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204–05. 
173.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204–05, 208, 212, 222; see also Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888–89. 
174.  See Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term 
Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2334 (2003) 
(describing Eldred as providing deferential review to Congress). 
175.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888–89; see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212–13. 
176.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889 (“The provision of incentives for the creation of new works is 
surely an essential means to advance the spread of knowledge and learning. We hold, however, that it is 
not the sole means Congress may use ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science.’”). 
177.  Id. 
178.  Id. 
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possibilities of progress may support the reasonableness of Congress’s 
action under the Copyright Clause.179 
These teachings from Eldred and Golan support an interpretation of the 
Copyright Clause that allows Congress to exercise content discrimination 
in copyright. Such discrimination would represent a policy that, in 
Congress’s judgment, best effectuates the aim of promoting progress. 
Under this principle, Congress would determine which particular content 
promotes progress more so than other content. And such discrimination 
appears reasonable against the standard of Golan, where potential indirect 
effects of a congressional act were deemed sufficient to find the 
congressional act a reasonable exercise of promoting progress. Thus, from 
the standpoint of congressional deference, Eldred and Golan open the door 
for interpreting the Copyright Clause as allowing congressional content 
discrimination. 
b. Opposition to Content Discrimination 
Despite the great deference that the Supreme Court provided Congress 
in Eldred and Golan, other aspects of these cases suggest that the Court 
might not read the Copyright Clause as allowing for content discrimination. 
To begin with, both Eldred and Golan deal with Congress expanding 
copyright coverage, whereas content discrimination involves shrinking that 
coverage. In theory this should not make a difference: the Court made clear 
that it will not second-guess the “delicate balance” that Congress achieves 
in drawing lines of copyright.180 But it remains to be seen whether the 
Court would be as deferential to Congress where Congress decreases 
protection.181 
Some reasoning in Eldred also does not support content discrimination. 
The Eldred Court reasoned that it would be unfair for the author of 
yesterday’s work to receive a different reward than the author of 
tomorrow’s work, so a retroactive application of the term extension was 
justified.182 Yet this seemingly unfair situation is exactly what my 
interpretation would lead to. The author of yesterday’s pornography could 
receive life-plus-seventy years of copyright, whereas if Congress removes 
protection for that content, the author of tomorrow’s pornography would 
 
179.  Id. 
180.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 205 n.10. 
181.  See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and 
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 543 (2004) (observing that “copyright has been a one-way 
ratchet, covering more works and granting more rights for a longer time”). 
182.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204. 
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receive no copyright. Discrimination that discourages content may 
therefore lead to the unfair outcome that Eldred rejected. 
Another point about Eldred and Golan that stands in contrast to content 
discrimination is the Court’s subtle focus on a quantitative, rather than a 
qualitative standard, for reviewing congressional actions under the 
Copyright Clause.183 As discussed above, an interpretation of the Copyright 
Clause that is consistent with content discrimination requires Progress to 
mean advancement or improvement in knowledge, which would thereby 
enable Congress to make qualitative judgments relating to particular 
expression.184 This interpretation is absent in the Court’s explanation of the 
Copyright Clause. Specifically, in explaining that the Copyright Clause 
allows Congress to legislate for a purpose other than the creation of new 
works, the Golan Court cited dissemination as another important purpose 
supporting the promotion of progress.185 The Court also read “Progress of 
Science” as meaning “the creation and spread of knowledge and 
learning.”186 Its emphasis on creation, dissemination, and spread implicitly 
suggests that the term Progress denotes only that which results in a 
quantitative increase of works. In short, the Court’s quantitative framework 
is inconsistent with an interpretation of Progress that would allow for 
content discrimination. 
The upshot of Eldred and Golan is that in one respect the Court left the 
door open for content-based discrimination by Congress, articulating a 
lenient standard of deferential review. But the Court’s paradigmatic 
understanding of the Copyright Clause might give Congress trouble. The 
Court seems prepared to support congressional acts that extend copyright 
coverage and aim to increase quantitative output of works. It remains to be 
seen whether the Court would read the Copyright Clause as consistent with 
decreasing the output of works in support of a qualitative interpretation of 
Progress.187 
 
183.  See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 (emphasizing dissemination); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206 
(construing CTEA as providing incentive to create and disseminate works). 
184.  See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
185.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206. 
186.  Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 (emphasis added); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206. 
187.  A Fourth Circuit decision might be interpreted as suggesting against content discrimination 
in copyright. See Satellite Broad. & Commc’ns Ass’n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2001). There, 
Congress imposed a “carry one, carry all” rule under the Intellectual Property Clause. Id. at 367. The 
rule became relevant when satellite carriers invoked a statutory copyright license for any broadcasts 
they carried from any particular stations in a local market. Id. at 343. Specifically, the rule required such 
a carrier to broadcast all requesting stations within that market—in addition to the one it had chosen to 
carry under the statutory copyright license. Id. The satellite companies argued that the rule was 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 352. The Court disagreed, 
holding that the rule was content-neutral and thereby not subject to strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 354–
55. This portion of the court’s ruling suggests, then, that if Congress were to award copyright based on 
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III. POLICY 
Even if the text of the Copyright Clause and the history of Congress 
suggest the constitutionality of content-based copyright denial, policy 
considerations are another matter. Simply put, does constitutional policy 
favor an interpretation of the Copyright Clause that allows Congress to 
engage in content-based copyright denial? This part argues that policy does 
support this interpretation. Section A sets forth two reasons: first, 
Congress’s collective perspective is more valuable in achieving copyright’s 
collective end than is an individual’s perspective; and second, Congress’s 
ability to tailor copyright law according to content enables more efficient 
monopolies, avoiding wasteful content suppression. Section B considers 
arguments against the interpretation: specifically, the untrustworthy nature 
of Congress; the difficulties of assessing content; and the effects of industry 
capture. 
A. Policy Supporting Content Discrimination 
1. A Collective Perspective 
The purpose of copyright is to benefit the collective society—not 
individuals.188 Copyright functions by preventing persons from copying an 
author’s work, not because the author has an inherent right to the copyright 
monopoly, but rather because the monopoly enables society to achieve a 
collective end. In particular, the societal end of copyright is to improve and 
advance knowledge and learning.189 
Despite this collective end of copyright law, copyright law relies on 
decisions of individuals. Individual preferences determine the success or 
failure of copyrighted content in the commercial marketplace. Individuals 
decide whether to purchase the copyrighted content, and that decision 
dictates the success of particular content. This individual-evaluation system 
is desirable because individual assessments are inherently trustworthy: 
 
a speaker’s content, the copyright legislation would be subject to a strict scrutiny analysis, and thereby 
unconstitutional. 
188.  The premise that copyright exists to further the collective good is fundamental in both 
ancient and modern copyright jurisprudence. See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 353–57 (1991) (rejecting Lockean sweat-of-the-brow argument as basis for copyright, 
and implicitly recognizing that copyright exists as a statutory right for Congress to define within 
constitutional bounds); Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 846–47; 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 143–45 
(overturning Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201; 4 Burr. 2303, which had recognized common 
law basis for copyright, on basis that copyright is subject to the instrumental will of Parliament). 
Indeed, the Copyright Clause specifies the purpose of copyright as an instrumentalist reason—
promoting the progress of science. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
189.  See discussion supra Part II.A.2–3. 
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individual preferences of the public reflect genuine opinion about the 
particular content under consideration, as opposed to potential political 
agendas of individual government actors.190 Hence, copyright law relies on 
individual assessments of content to reach its collective end of promoting 
the progress of science. 
This reliance on individual assessments can be problematic, however. 
Individual assessments do not always account for the utility or harm that 
particular content may pose to the collective.191 Even if collectively the 
public would prefer an increase in content that promotes the progress of 
science, individual preferences do not always reflect that collective goal. 
On average, individual consumers more often prefer mindless video games 
to thoughtful scholarship; pointless pornography to serious documentary; 
or defamatory mud-slinging to principled opinion.192 Individuals often 
focus on the immediate and pleasant effects of content rather than its long-
term effects on advancing knowledge. Indeed, the commercial marketplace 
does not promise that consumers will base their preferences on the goal of 
improving knowledge or learning; rather, that marketplace promises only 
efficiency in the matching of consumer with content. In short, individual 
preferences in the commercial marketplace seem particularly ill fitted as 
the means for promoting the collective end of progress in science. 
There is thus a gap between the end and means of copyright: the end is 
collective; the means are individual. Congress bridges the gap. As a 
collective institution for deciding social policy, Congress brings collective 
values to content evaluation that individuals lack.193 Congress can account 
for social utility and harm across society. This is not to say, however, that 
copyright law should rely exclusively on Congress for determining whether 
specific views can receive a copyright. To be sure, individuals should still 
determine the value of particular copyrighted works.194 Yet Congress 
should be able to channel those individual determinations toward certain 
categories of content that are more valuable from a collective 
perspective.195 So although copyright law relies on individual preferences 
to determine particular content’s value, the benefit of a collective 
perspective in assessing that value may be realized from Congress defining 
copyright eligibility for general categories of content. In short, Congress 
 
190.  See Snow, supra note 3, at 1512–13. 
191.  Copyright employs a commercial incentive structure that relies on individual choice. See 
generally Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 14–15 (1995) (“Copyright is about helping copyright owners make money.”). 
192.  See Snow, supra note 3, at 1511–12. 
193.  Id. at 1512–13. 
194.  See discussion supra Part II.A.3 (explaining that the public, rather than Congress, chooses 
among competing views of content). 
195.  See Snow, supra note 3, at 1512–13. 
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should determine which content individuals may evaluate in the 
commercial marketplace. 
Congress is also better positioned than individuals to account for 
negative externalities of content. Individual authors and consumers may 
fail to account for harms to innocent third parties that follow from 
content.196 For instance, commentators argue that some violent video games 
may cause aggressive behavior, possibly leading to serious social harms in 
extreme cases.197 Similarly, commentators argue that pornography harms 
women both generally and specifically (in the production process).198 Yet 
these facts would not likely affect the behavior of their authors and 
consumers. Authors and consumers of such content presumably do not 
consider these effects when deciding which content to create and consume. 
As with any market, the financial marketplace for content is not immune 
from individual decisionmakers failing to internalize the social costs of 
individual decisions. Congress, on the other hand, is better equipped to 
recognize and assess those externalities. 
Related to the problem of negative externalities is the problem of 
imperfect information. Assuming that some content may lead to harmful 
effects for the individual consumer, such consumers may lack this 
knowledge. Their individual means of acquiring information restrains their 
knowledge: some information is known best through collective means, 
such as studying multiple persons who have consumed the content.199 
Suppose, for instance, that certain pornographic content leads some 
consumers to behave in a manner that is destructive to family relationships. 
For an individual consumer of pornography, the fact that consuming the 
content could damage his family relationships would likely be relevant to 
his purchasing decision. Yet that likelihood may be unknown to the 
individual consumer. Individual consumers lack resources to gather and 
assess data relating to the consequences of pornography consumption.200 
Thus, Congress as a collective institution provides a distinct advantage 
over individuals for realizing the collective end of copyright—promoting 
progress in science. Congress has both a collective perspective and 
collective resources to assess content value. By allowing Congress to 
determine which content should receive copyright, Congress can exercise 
the perspective and implement the resources best able to yield social 
advancements in knowledge. 
 
196.  See id. 
197.  See infra note 258 and accompanying text. 
198.  See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Objectification, in SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 213, 234–36 
(1999); MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 16–18. 
199.  See Snow, supra note 3, at 1513. 
200.  See id. at 1514. 
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2. An Efficient Suppression of Copying 
Defining copyright eligibility according to content makes good sense 
because not all content requires the same rights of exclusion to realize the 
purpose of copyright. That is, not all content requires the same set or term 
of exclusive rights to incentivize its creation and dissemination. For 
instance, it is possible that the copyright term for computer programs need 
not be as long as the term for full-length feature films.201 Or the term 
necessary to incent news stories may be considerably shorter than the term 
necessary to incent academic textbooks. In view of this practical reality, if 
Congress must set the same term with the same rights for all content, 
Congress would be extending the copyright monopoly longer than is 
necessary for certain content. A lengthy copyright duration—and for some 
content, even the very existence of a copyright—would be wasteful. Thus, 
a uniform set of property rights granted to all content suggests that some 
copiers of content must remain silent longer than necessary to incentivize 
content creation. And the unnecessary suppression of content repetition 
slows content dissemination, which hampers the purpose of copyright. 
In selecting the copyright term and scope of rights, Congress should 
balance the public’s interest in incenting the particular content against the 
public’s interest in gaining access to that content. That balance may vary 
according to content. Some content that unquestionably promotes progress 
may not need any copyright to exist.202 This might include, for instance, 
scholarly research or academic papers.203 To the extent that this sort of 
content is self-producing, society gains no social benefit for the cost of 
imposing an artificial monopoly, so the copyright is wasteful. Such a 
content-based copyright denial would support its further dissemination, 
thereby promoting progress in science. 
Some categories of content might promote progress, but their overlap 
with other forms of intellectual property may not require as long a term as 
other content categories. The social costs of monopolizing such content 
 
201.  See id. at 1514–15. 
202.  See generally Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 623, 624 (2012) (questioning copyright’s assumption that external incentives are necessary); 
Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 513, 515 (2009) (“[T]he desire to create can be excessive, beyond rationality, and free from the 
need for economic incentive. . . . [A] copyright law that treats creativity as a product of economic 
incentives can miss the mark and harm what it aims to promote.”). 
203.  See Jessica Litman, The Economics of Open Access Law Publishing, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 779, 782 (2006) (“The role of copyright in the dissemination of scholarly research is in many 
ways curious, since neither authors nor the entities that compensate them for their authorship are 
motivated by the incentives supplied by the copyright system.”). Denying copyright for such works 
would implicate a means of distribution different from the current publication regime. See id. at 782–
83. 
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through two distinct intellectual-property regimes might justify adjusting 
the term of copyright. This category might include industrial design or 
applied art that substantially serves a utilitarian purpose, potentially 
qualifying for a patent.204 Similarly, certain content might arise because of 
the opportunity to exploit only some of the exclusive rights available in a 
copyright. Film and musical content may be an example of this 
phenomenon: it may be the case that only the rights of distribution and 
public performance incentivize their production and dissemination. If this 
is so, Congress might curtail the right of reproduction for these categories 
of content: consumers would then be able to create personal copies of films 
and music without violating copyright.205 In short, although these examples 
may not reflect an accurate assessment of the particular lines that Congress 
should draw, the examples illustrate that content-based flexibility in 
extending copyright would allow Congress to efficiently structure the 
suppressive monopoly of copyright.206 
B. Arguments Against Content Discrimination 
Practical concerns may be raised that suggest against Congress 
exercising content-based discrimination in copyright. First and foremost, 
Congress does not seem a trustworthy actor for the purpose of determining 
which content furthers social policy. Second, and related to the first point, 
giving Congress the power of discrimination over content could further the 
influence of large corporate actors in the legislative process. Third, even 
assuming pure motives, Congress seems incompetent both to assess 
subjective values that copyright should encourage and to identify the 
influence of copyright’s monopoly on expressional output. These concerns 
are discussed in turn. 
 
204.  Cf. Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to 
Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 738–48 (1983) (arguing for discriminatory 
determinations of copyrightable industrial design based on influence of functional considerations in 
design process). 
205.  Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012) (imposing compulsory license scheme for “nondramatic musical 
works”). 
206.  Some expression may be difficult to incent without a longer term. Perhaps authors of 
private diary entries need assurance that their works will receive copyright protection well beyond their 
death. Cf. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1987) (recognizing author’s right 
to first publication of private works outweighs usual claim of fair use). But see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating 
that unpublished nature of work does not bar finding of fair use). 
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1. An Untrustworthy Congress 
Congress has a history of acting for political gain rather than for the 
good of collective society.207 In the face of this history, the benefits of 
content-based copyright denial seem nothing more than a distant 
possibility. Although Congress might exercise its discretion to benefit the 
collective good, practical history suggests that Congress will not. At best, 
members of Congress seem to act for their own constituencies; at worst, 
they act for their personal interests. Either way, a bare possibility that 
Congress could exercise discretion to benefit the entire collective good of 
society seems unpersuasive as a reason to allow the discretion in the first 
place. Why should we trust Congress with a power of discrimination if, as a 
practical matter, Congress would use that power to further the interests of 
individuals rather than the collective? Indeed, to justify giving power to an 
actor that has a faulty record of performance, there must be an actual 
problem worth fixing—a problem that reflects more than mere 
inefficiencies and inaccuracies. There must be a problem with content that 
is so harmful that even Congress would act in the best interest of the 
collective to fix it. 
This argument certainly has merit. But it is not as powerful as it may 
first seem. As an initial matter, Congress’s power to discriminate through 
denying copyright is not a power to act as a gatekeeper for ideas. And this 
is because copyright gives Congress only limited influence over content. 
Congress can affect only content that requires government-backed rights of 
exclusion as a justification for production or dissemination. Those rights 
are often not necessary. In an age of digital encryption, the absence of a 
government monopoly would not likely be fatal to a category of content.208 
Indeed, in some instances, architectural rights of exclusion may represent 
more efficient means than government rights of exclusion.209 Denying 
copyright for violent video games, for instance, would not affect 
gamemakers’ ability to profit from selling apps through iTunes. Moreover, 
content that does not rely on a financial incentive would be completely 
unaffected by a copyright denial. Where content creators do not seek to 
profit, the copyright denial would be irrelevant. Pornography on YouTube, 
for instance, would not go away in the absence of copyright. Hence, 
content-based copyright denial does not deny authors access to the 
 
207.  See generally Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 760 (2012) 
(observing public’s perception of Congress as an untrustworthy actor). 
208.  See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 501, 514–15 (1999); Snow, supra note 3, at 1520. 
209.  See Snow, supra note 3, at 1520. 
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financial marketplace (or the marketplace of ideas for that matter)210—it 
denies authors only a government monopoly within that marketplace.211 
In addition to the limited nature of Congress’s influence over content, 
very real problems justify the risk of allowing Congress a power of content 
discrimination. Serious social harms follow from certain content. Consider 
pornography, violent video games,212 hate speech,213 and crime-facilitating 
material.214 Some scholars observe great social harms that follow from 
these categories of content. Some have argued that pornography harms the 
social institutions of marriage and family;215 harms women both generally 
and specifically (in the production process);216 provokes bad norms; and 
damages children’s moral development.217 Some have argued that violent 
video games increase aggressive tendencies of their consumers.218 Some 
have argued that hate speech can cause psychological injury to victims as 
well as harm competing constitutional values of equality, privacy, and 
human dignity.219 Some have argued that crime-facilitating material can 
lead to terrorist harms on many innocent victims.220 If accurate, these 
effects of content would be highly destructive for the social infrastructure 
of society. Although the scope of this Article prevents me from offering a 
meaningful assessment on the likelihood and actuality of these harms, I do 
observe others who forcefully argue that socially destructive harms derive 
from certain categories of content.221 
Admittedly, these harms cannot always be proven as directly caused by 
the content at issue; they do not necessarily occur in every instance; or they 
are not immediately apparent. As a result, the harms do not justify 
altogether banning or otherwise punishing the content: the content still 
receives protection under the Free Speech Clause.222 The content, then, may 
 
210.  See id. at 1521. 
211.  Even then, the strength of that monopoly advantage is debatable. See Mark A. Lemley & 
Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 
GEO. L.J. 2055, 2104–07 (2012) (explaining how doctrines of substantial similarity, derivative works, 
and fair use may reduce monopoly power of copyright). 
212.  See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011); see id. at 2761–71 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
213.  See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 8, at 45. 
214.  See Volokh, supra note 8, at 1217. 
215.  See Robert P. George, The Concept of Public Morality, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 17–18 (2000). 
216.  See Nussbaum, supra note 198, at 213; MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 16–17. 
217.  See Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635, 
1647–72 (2005). 
218.  See infra note 258. 
219.  See Levinson, supra note 8, at 77–78. 
220.  See Volokh, supra note 8, at 1217. 
221.  See supra notes 212–217; Snow, supra note 3, at 1522. 
222.  See Snow, supra note 3, at 1523. 
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be compared to a subtle cause of cancer: its harmful effect often cannot be 
proven and usually is not immediate, so the law cannot ban it.223 
Nevertheless, the destructive harm continues.224 What can be done? The 
answer is copyright: copyright represents a limited means for controlling 
harmful content where more effective means of control are simply not 
permitted because of uncertainty relating to causality and immediacy of 
harm.225 Copyright is the compromise.226 
2. Industry Capture 
It might be argued that Congress practicing content discrimination 
would only exacerbate an existent problem of industry capture. Professor 
Jessica Litman has convincingly mapped the history of content industries 
capturing Congress’s copyright power.227 Calling for Congress to extend 
and curtail copyright rights based on the content of particular expression 
would only further expand the dominion of wealthy copyright holders. 
Commercial industry would extend its hold over public policy. 
This argument certainly has strength in its factual assessment of 
Congress. I agree that one effect of Congress imposing content-based 
discrimination may be to strengthen the hand of commercial industry in 
policy-making decisions. And I further agree that this commercial 
influence is not healthy in deciding matters of public policy—at least not in 
copyright, which exists to promote the progress of science. I disagree, 
however, that this is a reason for Congress to refrain from exercising 
content-based discretion in forming copyright law. For one thing, 
discrimination would likely make the influence of commercial industry 
more transparent. If Congress were to adjust copyright protection for 
specific categories of content, the reason for that adjustment would become 
more evident than if Congress were to make the very same adjustment for 
all content. For instance, a retroactive extension of the copyright term by 
twenty years for children’s animated characters and movies would raise 
questions regarding Congress’s rationale for targeting that particular 
 
223.  See id. 
224.  See id. 
225.  See id. at 1523. 
226.  It is important to note that I am not arguing that copyright denial will necessarily reduce 
content production in every case. The effect of copyright will depend on the content at issue. Denying 
copyright for some content—academic papers, for instance—might actually increase content production 
and dissemination. My argument is simply that Congress should be able to examine, and act on, the 
issue. Congress should be able to ask whether granting or denying copyright for a particular category of 
content furthers the progress of science. 
227.  See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22–32 (2001); Jessica D. Litman, 
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 870–79 (1987). 
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expression, much more so than if Congress had extended the term across 
the board.228 Hence, even assuming industry capture of copyright, the 
influence of particular industries would likely become more apparent with 
content-based discrimination than the influence presently is. 
Related to facilitating transparency, discrimination would likely limit 
the effects of content-industry lobbying on the Copyright Act as a whole. 
By exercising discrimination according to content that reflects 
commercially driven influences, Congress would—perhaps unintentionally 
—preserve remaining content from the effects of those influences. For 
instance, suppose again that in response to industry pressure, Congress 
retroactively extended the copyright term for children’s animated 
characters and movies. Other forms of expression would not be subject to 
the imbalance that a content-specific industry had introduced into 
copyright. That is to say, the industry-capture effect would at least be 
limited to the content of the industry seeking special treatment. On the 
assumption, then, that particular industries are presently influencing 
Congress’s exercise of the copyright power, content discrimination would 
appear to aid in limiting the scope of that influence. 
3. Difficulties in Identifying Values and Incentives 
Even assuming the purest congressional motives in attempting to 
promote progress, it might be argued that Congress simply lacks the 
competency to make value-based distinctions among content. It is arguable 
that the market better reflects public preferences of content than does the 
heavy hand of government. Let the public discourage the production of 
pornography by failing to purchase it, rather than the government through 
dictating its moral judgment—so the argument goes.229 This argument, 
then, is one that paints a paternalistic picture of Congress imposing its 
values over the public’s content. 
I appreciate these problems relating to the subjectivity of values. They 
should not be ignored. Yet they are insufficient to excuse Congress from its 
role of determining content that promotes and impedes progress. Congress 
represents the institution charged with deciding policy that will promote 
progress. Its resources enable value judgments—the same value judgments 
 
228.  Cf. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–514) (adding twenty years to term of all works). 
229.  Cf. Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 861 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(extending copyright to legally obscene material on grounds that “it is inappropriate for a court . . . to 
interpose its moral views between an author and his willing audience”). 
1 SNOW 583-633 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2016  8:34 AM 
626 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 67:3:583 
 
that are relevant to social-policy choices in other contexts.230 Congress uses 
the people’s money to subsidize value-laden activities and programs.231 
Using property rights to subsidize expression should not be any different.232 
Indeed, if public preferences were necessary to determine resources that 
Congress expended under the Spending Clause, Congress would only be 
able to provide cash subsidies to the public rather than fund programs 
directly.233 Only with cash subsidies could members of the public 
determine which activities best promoted their own general welfare.234 But 
this, of course, ignores reality. Congress determines which values to 
promote through its use of public funds. Congress, then, should determine 
which values to promote through copyright. 
Simply put, Congress is charged with, and has the competency for, 
implementing social policy. Although varying value systems and uncertain 
incentive structures can make the question of content evaluation a difficult 
one, that fact does not mean that Congress should never ask the question. 
Congress represents the branch of government that is responsible for 
identifying circumstances and implementing policy with available 
resources. Copyright is one of those resources—even where policy choices 
may be difficult. 
IV. APPLICATION EXAMPLES 
The Copyright Clause should thus be interpreted as enabling Congress 
to exercise content discrimination in defining copyright eligibility. 
Congress may deny copyright where the criterion for denial is viewpoint 
neutral and it may grant copyright to content where that content is 
consistent with a cultural understanding of improving or advancing 
knowledge.235 This part analyzes two examples of content categories where 
Congress might choose to restrict copyright protection: pornography and 
violent video games. I touch on whether policy and political attractiveness 
suggest that Congress should and could deny copyright for these categories 
 
230.  See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998) (explaining 
necessity of favoring speech in funding decisions for art program); Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983) (“Congressional selection of particular entities or 
persons for entitlement to this sort of largesse is obviously a matter of policy and discretion not open to 
judicial review unless in circumstances which here we are not able to find.” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
231.  See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (placing abortion restrictions on 
funding of family-planning programs). 
232.  See Snow, supra note 3, at 1490–96 (comparing rationale of restrictions of funding with 
restrictions of extending copyright). 
233.  See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
234.  See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
235.  See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
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of content, and then I briefly address the constitutional requirements under 
the Copyright Clause. 
A. Pornography 
1. Policy and Politics 
The first example involves Congress denying copyright for adult 
pornography. Policy arguments over pornography are extensive in the 
literature.236 I observe only a few here. Against pornography is the 
argument that it causes moral harm to society. Pornography, it is argued, 
harms the social institutions of marriage and family life;237 objectifies 
humans;238 causes harmful treatment of women both generally and in the 
pornography-production process specifically;239 provokes bad norms; and 
damages children’s moral development.240 If these effects are accurate, they 
indicate strong reasons to reduce its proliferation. 
Critics of pornography regulation most often rely on a policy argument 
of free speech.241 It is argued that speakers and their willing audiences 
should be able to engage in their own private conversations, indecent or 
otherwise.242 This argument has proven sufficiently strong to merit speech 
protection from government censorship, but it is lacking as a reason to 
establish copyright protection from private copying. Indeed, the literature 
lacks arguments relating to social value that pornography brings to 
collective society. From a social-collective perspective, the value of 
pornography is absent. 
Perhaps a stronger argument against copyright denial is not based on 
the merits of pornography, but rather the effect of the denial.243 Professors 
Christopher Cotropia and James Gibson have argued that removing 
 
236.  E.g., NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT 
FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS (1995); George, supra note 215, at 17–18; Koppelman, supra note 217, at 1647–
72; John Copeland Nagle, Pornography as Pollution, 70 MD. L. REV. 939, 940 (2011) (summarizing 
arguments of pornography opponents); see also Elizabeth Harmer Dionne, Pornography, Morality, and 
Harm: Why Miller Should Survive Lawrence, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 611, 637–42 (2008) (reciting 
social-science research on pornography effects). 
237.  See George, supra note 215, at 17–18. 
238.  See NUSSBAUM, supra note 198, at 213. 
239.  See MacKinnon, supra note 8, at 16–17. 
240.  See Koppelman, supra note 217, at 1647. 
241.  See, e.g., STROSSEN, supra note 236. 
242.  See generally United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 234–35 (2003) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 602–07 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
243.  See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s 
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 961–66 (2010). 
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copyright from pornography would likely increase its proliferation.244 
Their argument is straightforward: by denying copyright, the law would 
decrease front-end creation of pornography only marginally, owing to a 
dramatic increase in web-based pornography created by amateur 
pornographers who don’t enforce their copyright rights.245 Moreover, by 
denying copyright, the law would dramatically increase back-end 
dissemination of pornography, as consumers would be able to freely 
distribute existent pornography without legal restraint.246 Denying 
copyright, then, would seem to only marginally decrease front-end 
creation, but dramatically increase back-end dissemination. 
To a certain extent, this conclusion makes sense in the context of a 
court denying copyright for pornography. In that setting, the court’s denial 
would affect the copyright validity for pornography content already 
created.247 But the conclusion is dubitable in the context of Congress 
denying copyright only prospectively.248 A prospective denial would enable 
copyright to continue to restrain copying of existent pornography. The 
denial, then, would only decrease the front-end creation of pornography by 
creators who rely on copyright, having no effect on back-end copying of 
existent pornography, and for that matter, on either front-end creation or 
back-end copying of pornography created by amateur pornographers who 
don’t rely on copyright. Therefore, under a prospective copyright denial of 
pornography, back-end copying would not increase while front-end 
creation would decrease. Denying copyright prospectively would seem to 
introduce a net decrease in pornography production.249 
 
244.  See id. 
245.  See id. 
246.  See id. 
247.  Cf. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991) (denying copyright 
for already-existing white pages). 
248.  A congressional retroactive denial of copyright could raise takings issues that would be 
prohibitively costly. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The 
Sovereign’s Prerogative, 67 TEX. L. REV. 685, 692–93 (1989) (examining takings issue that would arise 
if Congress exercised eminent domain over copyrighted works). 
249.  On the other hand, some pornographers have used copyright to pressure aggregator websites 
into policing for unauthorized content, leading the aggregators to adopt policies that excessively block 
distribution of all pornographic content—a point raised by Professors Cotropia and Gibson. See 
Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 243, at 965–66. This fact suggests that even a prospective denial of 
copyright would hinder reducing pornography dissemination. But since the article of Professors 
Cotropia and Gibson, this factual premise has been called into doubt. Courts have refrained from 
imposing liability on aggregator websites for unauthorized content. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, 
Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 32 (2d Cir. 2012) (requiring “actual knowledge or awareness of facts or 
circumstances that indicate specific and identifiable instances of infringement” for aggregator-website 
liability); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(“[M]erely hosting a category of copyrightable content, such as music videos, with the general 
knowledge that one’s services could be used to share infringing material, is insufficient to meet the 
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In the end, however, the actual effect of denying copyright for 
pornography cannot be known until Congress does so. For pornography in 
particular, the issue is highly circumstantial. So in view of the uncertainty, 
the effect of copyright denial on content production should not dictate a 
course of action that is contrary to the constitutional presumption of 
copyright’s effect. The Copyright Clause relies on the presumption that 
content production increases with copyright.250 Unless evidence establishes 
a contrary effect, copyright should be denied for pornography.251 
From a political standpoint, support for denying copyright to 
pornography would likely be strong. Lawmakers are continually criticizing 
its proliferation.252 In 2013, for instance, forty-two Senators—Republicans 
and Democrats alike—called for an increase in adult-pornography criminal 
prosecution.253 Congress also has a history of implementing conditions for 
funding programs that restrict pornography dissemination.254 It therefore 
seems likely that Congress would find it politically attractive to deny 
copyright for pornography. 
2. Constitutionality 
As discussed in Part II.A.3, a constitutional denial of copyright for 
content would necessitate that the designated category be viewpoint 
neutral. This is debatable. Pornography as a criterion for copyright denial 
seems to target the viewpoint that women should be portrayed in a certain 
manner.255 A value-based criterion of content—such as indecent, lewd, or 
immoral—would imply that Congress disagrees with the pornographer’s 
portrayal of women, or in other words, the message communicated. Such 
criteria suggest viewpoint discrimination.256 
 
actual knowledge requirement . . . .”). In view of this reluctance to attach liability for those websites, 
copyright law would not seem to introduce an unproductive bottleneck for disseminating pornography. 
250.  See Snow, supra note 38, at 314. 
251.  See id. In short, pornography is not the proper vehicle to promote the progress of science, so 
copyright is not the proper vehicle to deal with the problems of pornography. Congress should not 
employ copyright as a means to resolve social harms of pornography—through either denial or grant. If 
pornography causes social harm, let it happen without the copyright subsidy. 
252.  See Nagle, supra note 236, at 941 n.14 (reciting statements by congressional lawmakers 
relating to pornography). 
253.  See Letter from 42 Senators to Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen. (Apr. 4, 2011), 
http://www.politico.com/static/PPM153_obsc.html. 
254.  See infra note 257. 
255.  See Geoffrey R. Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 461, 463 (1986) (“[A]nti-pornography legislation expressly discriminates on 
the basis of viewpoint . . . .”). 
256.  If Congress were to define pornography as “indecent expression,” the word indecent 
suggests that pornographic works are offensive, improper, or undesirable—or in other words, that this 
sort of expression is wrong. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 593 n.1 (1998) 
1 SNOW 583-633 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2016  8:34 AM 
630 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 67:3:583 
 
The line between viewpoint and content, however, is never clear. 
Pornography may also be considered as a general category of content—
specifically, content that is likely to arouse sexual stimulation or content 
that appeals to the prurient interest. Such descriptions do not appear to 
target the portrayal of women as much as they target effects that follow 
from content. And as between the two constructions of pornography—
viewpoint-based or neutral—the Supreme Court has a history of treating 
pornography as viewpoint neutral.257 Denying pornography would likely be 
constitutional under the Copyright Clause. 
B. Violent Video Games 
1. Policy and Politics 
On the question of copyright denial for violent video games, policy 
arguments are mixed. On the one hand, several studies conclude that 
playing such games leads to aggressive behavior, at least in the short 
term.258 So for the sake of protecting innocent third parties from that 
aggressive behavior, copyright should be denied. On the other hand, other 
 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (assuming that discriminating term “decency” imposes viewpoint). Similarly, if 
Congress were to define pornography as expression that portrays women “as submissive in matters 
sexual or as enjoying humiliation,” the discriminating criteria would represent disapproval of a 
viewpoint about women—an approach expressly rejected by the Seventh Circuit in American 
Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985). 
257.  The Supreme Court allowed Congress to refrain from extending subsidies to pornographic 
works in both National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. at 574–75, and United States v. 
American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 209 (2003) (plurality). Tellingly, Congress’s definition of 
pornography in both these cases could be construed as viewpoint based, i.e., “decency and respect” in 
Finley, 524 U.S. at 572, and “harmful to minors” in American Library, 539 U.S. at 201. Under 
spending-power doctrine, viewpoint-discriminatory funding is permissible only if Congress is speaking 
or transmitting its own message through private speakers. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 
533, 541 (2001). Neither situation applies in Finley or American Library. Yet in both cases, the Court 
upheld the pornography criterion. Finley, 524 U.S. at 589–90; Am. Library, 539 U.S. at 210. Ostensibly, 
then, the pornographic criteria were viewpoint neutral. Hence, pornographic works appear likely to 
constitute a permissible category of content for which Congress may deny copyright. 
258.  See, e.g., Brad J. Bushman & Craig A. Anderson, Violent Video Games and Hostile 
Expectations: A Test of the General Aggression Model, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
1679–86 (2002) (“[T]he present study supports the General Aggression Model–based prediction that 
exposure to violent media can influence the amount of aggressive expectations that people conjure up in 
response to potential conflict situations.”); Youssef Hasan et al., The More You Play, the More 
Aggressive You Become: A Long-Term Experimental Study of Cumulative Violent Video Game Effects 
on Hostile Expectations and Aggressive Behavior, 49 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 224–27 
(2013) (testing cumulative effect of violent video games and concluding that “aggressive behavior and 
hostile expectations increased over days for violent game players, but not for nonviolent video game 
players”). 
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studies conclude that such games actually reduce crime.259 Potential 
criminals apparently vent their aggressive tendencies in virtual reality 
rather than in real-space crime situations.260 The evidence, then, does not 
seem to dictate a clear policy position on whether Congress should 
discourage violent video games. 
From a political standpoint, denying copyright for violent video games 
would likely garner substantial support. The seeming increase in public 
shootings has created significant public outcry against those games.261 
Often cited as a contributing factor in the shootings, such games have come 
under intense public and political scrutiny.262 And given the political 
controversy surrounding gun control, copyright denial seems much more 
politically attractive as a means of decreasing violent outbursts. 
2. Constitutionality 
As discussed above, the Copyright Clause would require viewpoint 
neutrality.263 Like pornography, the viewpoint neutrality of violent video 
games as a criterion for denying copyright is debatable. Such a criterion 
suggests that Congress does not agree with the particular message of 
violence. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Supreme Court 
recognized that objections to violence in video games constitute objections 
to the message itself—not merely the category of content.264 Thus, the 
Brown decision presents a formidable challenge to construing a violent-
video-games criterion for discrimination as viewpoint neutral. 
Yet despite Brown’s recognition of viewpoint discrimination, the 
context of copyright provides a distinct basis for construing a copyright 
denial to violent video games as viewpoint neutral. Key to the viewpoint-
neutrality inquiry is the reason that Congress discriminates.265 Under its 
copyright power, Congress may identify categories of content that are less 
likely to promote the progress of science.266 With regard to video games 
 
259.  E.g., A. Scott Cunningham et al., Understanding the Effects of Violent Video Games on 
Violent Crime 1 (Apr. 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1804959 (“[A] one 
percent increase in violent games is associated with up to a 0.03% decrease in violent crime . . . .”). 
260.  See Benedict Carey, Shooting in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/science/studying-the-effects-of-playing-violent-video-games.html. 
261.  See, e.g., Kesten, supra note 1. 
262.  See id. 
263.  See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
264.  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011). 
265.  See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736 (1990) (examining whether intent of 
government is to discourage viewpoint); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) 
(explaining that “[t]he government’s purpose is the controlling consideration” in deciding whether 
speech is content-based). 
266.  See discussion supra Parts II–III. 
1 SNOW 583-633 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2016  8:34 AM 
632 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 67:3:583 
 
generally, some types seem less likely to fulfill that purpose than do others. 
For instance, games that stimulate audiences through graphic violence 
seem much less likely to promote advancement in knowledge than do 
scholastic-educational games. Hence, Congress may identify that video 
games that have a purpose of stimulating audiences through engaging 
participants in graphically violent play are less likely to effect results that 
advance knowledge. The designated category of violence may serve to 
better identify content that fails to fulfill the mandate of the Copyright 
Clause, rather than to communicate disagreement with the message of 
violence itself. Thus, denying copyright for that category of video games 
could be construed as a viewpoint-neutral exercise of the copyright power. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Much like the spending power gives Congress power to promote 
general welfare through subsidizing activities with money, the copyright 
power gives Congress power to promote progress and advancements in 
knowledge through subsidizing expression with property rights.267 The 
copyright power represents a constitutional tool for Congress to promote 
certain content over other content.268 Indeed, the Copyright Clause 
mandates that Congress exercise its copyright power solely to promote the 
progress of science—a content-based end.269 That mandate provides 
sufficient discretion for Congress to extend, deny, or marginally adjust 
copyright protection for certain categories of content.270 The text of the 
Copyright Clause therefore supports content-based copyright denial. 
This interpretation draws support from policy considerations.271 
Congress as a collective institution has an advantage over individual 
members of the public in assessing the value of content. Congress has 
resources and perspectives that reflect collective society; individuals do 
not.272 Congress is more likely to account for negative externalities of 
expression; consumers are not.273 Congress has means to adjust the 
suppression of copying for efficiency of content dissemination; individuals 
do not.274 Congress can reduce the copyright term where the standard 
 
267.  See Snow, supra note 3, at 1490–96 (comparing the Spending Clause with the Copyright 
Clause). 
268.  See discussion supra Part II. 
269.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; discussion supra Part II.A. 
270.  See discussion supra Part II. 
271.  See discussion supra Part III. 
272.  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
273.  See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
274.  See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
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length would be wasteful for certain content; individuals cannot.275 In short, 
Congress brings a perspective and an ability that individuals lack, which 
enables Congress to more effectively attain the collective purpose of 
promoting the progress of science.276 
Of course there are limitations to this power—just like any other 
constitutional power. Doctrinally, Congress may never discriminate against 
viewpoints.277 More practically, the absence of copyright does not preclude 
creators from creating and even profiting from expression.278 In short, the 
copyright power does not give Congress power to forbid creators access to 
the financial marketplace. It merely gives Congress a power to deny 
creators a government-backed monopoly within that marketplace. 
Yet despite these limitations of the copyright power, that power does 
represent a means for influencing public discourse. Subject to its 
constitutional and practical limitations, the power enables Congress to 
further policy ends that depend on expressional content. Thus, the 
Copyright Clause gives Congress the power to grant or deny copyright for 
content that promotes or impedes the progress of science. 
 
 
275.  See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
276.  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
277.  See discussion supra Part II.A.3 (interpreting Copyright Clause as imposing viewpoint-
neutrality restriction on copyright denial); Snow, supra note 3, at 1517–18 (interpreting Free Speech 
Clause as imposing viewpoint-neutrality restriction on copyright denial). 
278.  See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
